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population ageing and the 
international capital market  
The prospective ageing of the population in many countries will 
affect the economy in many different ways. Yvonne Adema (Erasmus 
University Rotterdam and Netspar), Bas van Groezen (Utrecht 
University and Netspar) and Lex Meijdam (Tilburg University and 
Netspar) focus in this paper on the long-run effects on the 
international capital market by providing an overview of insights 
from both theoretical and empirical literature related to this topic. 
The final part of this paper is devoted to the quantitative effects 
found by various recent simulation studies.
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PREFACE 
 
 
 
 
Netspar stimulates debate and fundamental research in the field of 
pensions, aging and retirement. The aging of the population is front-page 
news, as many baby boomers are now moving into retirement. More 
generally, people live longer and in better health while at the same time 
families choose to have fewer children. Although the aging of the 
population often gets negative attention, with bleak pictures painted of 
the doubling of the ratio of the number of people aged 65 and older to the 
number of the working population during the next decades, it must, at the 
same time, be a boon to society that so many people are living longer and 
healthier lives. Can the falling number of working young afford to pay the 
pensions for a growing number of pensioners? Do people have to work a 
longer working week and postpone retirement? Or should the pensions be 
cut or the premiums paid by the working population be raised to afford 
social security for a growing group of pensioners? Should people be 
encouraged to take more responsibility for their own pension? What is the 
changing role of employers associations and trade unions in the 
organization of pensions? Can and are people prepared to undertake 
investment for their own pension, or are they happy to leave this to the 
pension funds? Who takes responsibility for the pension funds? How can a 
transparent and level playing field for pension funds and insurance 
companies be ensured? How should an acceptable trade-off be struck 
between social goals such as solidarity between young and old, or rich and 
poor, and individual freedom? But most important of all: how can the 
benefits of living longer and healthier be harnessed for a happier and 
more prosperous society?  
 The Netspar Panel Papers aim to meet the demand for understanding the 
ever-expanding academic literature on the consequences of aging 
populations. They also aim to help give a better scientific underpinning of 
policy advice. They attempt to provide a survey of the latest and most 
relevant research, try to explain this in a non-technical manner and outline 
the implications for policy questions faced by Netspar’s partners. Let there 
be no mistake. In many ways, formulating such a position paper is a 
tougher task than writing an academic paper or an op-ed piece. The 
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authors have benefitted from the comments of the Editorial Board on 
various drafts and also from the discussions during the presentation of their 
paper at a Netspar Panel Meeting.  
 I hope the result helps reaching Netspar’s aim to stimulate social 
innovation in addressing the challenges and opportunities raised by aging 
in an efficient and equitable manner and in an international setting. 
 
Henk Don 
Chairman of the Netspar Editorial Board 
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POPULATION AGEING AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKET 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses the effects of ageing on the international capital 
market. The first part applies a simple model and distinguishes between 
the cases of a small open economy and a closed economy to explore the 
separate effects of ageing, the design of pension schemes and government 
policy on savings, labour supply and the interest rate. The second part of 
the paper analyses cross-border capital flows and spillover effects caused 
by international differences in ageing patterns, pension schemes and 
policy reactions. The final part is devoted to the quantitative effects found 
by various recent simulation studies. 
 
Summary 
The prospective ageing of the population in many countries will affect the 
economy in many different ways. This paper focuses on the long-run effects 
on the international capital market by providing an overview of insights 
from both theoretical and empirical literature related to this topic. The first 
part of the paper explores the qualitative effects of both ageing and policy 
reactions, including spillover effects between countries, while the second 
part describes the quantitative effects that result from extensive 
computational models in which all different elements are brought together. 
In order to understand the diversity of mechanisms that are at work, the 
paper starts with a basic model in which at each moment, two generations 
(the working young and the retired) are alive, and analyses the separate 
effects of ageing for a single country. The key variable that determines the 
interest rate is the capital-labour ratio, which indicates the relative scarcity 
of capital compared to the size of the active labour force. The higher the 
ratio, the lower the interest rate. Two extreme cases are distinguished: the 
country is either a small open economy, with perfect international capital 
mobility and an exogenously determined interest rate, or a closed economy, 
where the interest rate adjusts to equate supply of and demand for capital. 
Subsequently, the model is extended by allowing for two countries that are 
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large enough for developments in one country to affect the other. This 
reveals the international spillover effects of ageing and government policy. 
In case of a small open economy, the interest rate and the capital-labour 
ratio are fixed. Ageing, in the form of a higher life expectancy, increases 
aggregate savings, which are partly invested abroad. Likewise, a lower 
fertility rate decreases the size of the labour force and also leads to an 
outflow of capital. The returns on these additional foreign investments are 
subsequently used to finance part of the consumption in the ageing 
economy, so that it becomes a rentier economy. 
 The case of a closed economy applies if the country is large, if capital is 
not mobile across borders, or if all small economies experience the same 
developments. Ageing will increase the capital-labour ratio – having a 
positive effect on the wage but a negative effect on the interest rate. The 
size of these effects is influenced by the design of the pension scheme. The 
larger the funded component, the stronger the effects will be. While a pay-
as-you-go (PAYG) scheme dampens these effects (especially if it is a 
defined-benefit plan), such a scheme simultaneously implies that ageing 
will lead to a lower consumption per capita. 
 The intermediate case is that of two countries with different 
characteristics but connected to each other through a common capital 
market. Developments in one country that affect savings and the size of the 
active labour force result in a changing capital-labour ratio and interest 
rate, thereby inducing an international capital flow and partly spilling over 
to the other country. A country that is ageing more strongly than another 
will –ceteris paribus– experience an outflow of capital. This also applies if it 
increases the funded part of its pension scheme relatively more, and if its 
public debt increases relatively less. Part of the beneficial effects of these 
policies that arise from a higher capital-labour ratio will then spill over to 
the other country, where wages will be higher and the interest rate lower. 
Likewise, countries with a funded scheme will eventually share in the costs 
of ageing in countries with an extensive PAYG scheme if the latter do not 
reform. These international spillover effects can be considered as 
externalities that individual countries typically do not take (fully) into 
account when formulating national policy. International policy coordination 
(e.g. through adherence to the Stability and Growth Pact and fine-tuning of 
pension policies) could therefore be welfare enhancing. Furthermore, 
countries with a relatively large public debt are more likely to favour a 
monetary policy that leads to a higher rate of inflation, which is harmful for 
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countries that rely on a funded scheme and form a monetary union with the 
previous ones. Because ageing puts more pressure on governments 
(especially those with extensive PAYG schemes) to reform, decrease benefits 
or increase contributions, an escape to higher public debt is quite plausible. 
The final part of the paper is devoted to the quantitative effects of ageing 
on the world interest rate. This basically boils down to the question whether 
ageing countries have sufficient opportunities to invest their relatively 
abundant capital in other parts of the world, including developing countries 
and rising countries like China and India. If international differences in the 
timing and extent of ageing are large enough, and if capital is quite mobile 
across borders, then the drop in the interest rate will be rather small. On 
the other hand, if the closed economy is a more likely scenario, and if 
pension systems are reformed towards more funded schemes on a large 
scale (without an accompanying increase in the active labour force), then 
the worldwide interest rate will sharply decrease, possibly resulting in what 
is called an asset meltdown. Simulation results from several studies that 
apply multi-country computational models show that the expected drop in 
the interest rate will be about 1 percentage point over the coming decades. 
If countries such as China are included, and if these are expected to grow 
and converge to the level of developed countries in the next period, then 
the drop in the interest rate will initially be lower, but in the medium- and 
long run they will be much larger, due to the increasing savings that leads 
to worldwide capital abundance. 
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1. Introduction  
 
In the coming decades, many countries will experience an ageing 
population as a result of lower fertility rates and increasing longevity, which 
will lead to higher old-age dependency ratios. As can be seen from Figures 
1-3, this is a worldwide phenomenon, but the timing and extent will differ 
between countries. Because also the design of pension schemes varies a 
great deal, the economies will be affected differently. 
 Due to increasing integration and globalisation, developments in one 
country can have serious consequences for other countries, which also holds 
for demographic developments. This is the central topic of this paper, which 
focuses on the imminent effects of population ageing on the international 
capital market, using the insights from recent theoretical and empirical 
studies in this area. Although this implies a macroeconomic perspective, we 
also pay attention to the microeconomic foundations in order to understand 
the various mechanisms behind the results. The starting point for the 
microeconomic analysis is the life-cycle model, according to which 
Old age dependency ratios (Source: United Nations Common Database (UNCDB), 2008) 
Figure 1: Europe 
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individuals save during their working life for their retirement, with saving 
through a pension fund providing a striking example of such life-cycle 
behaviour. We focus on the long-run effects of ageing and different policy 
measures, and refrain from discussing the short-run effects (see e.g., 
Adema, 2008), as well as from risk (see e.g., Fehr, 2009) and portfolio choice 
(see e.g., De Jong et al., 2008).  
 One of the key questions of this paper is how the interest rate on the 
world capital market will develop in the medium- and long run. This is the 
result of the interplay between several mechanisms. Broadly speaking, the 
interest rate is determined by the marginal product of capital, which 
depends on the relative scarcity of capital as reflected by the ratio of 
capital to labour. Ageing will affect this ratio through different channels. 
The first part of the paper disentangles these channels and analyses them 
separately for a single country. 
 Two extreme cases will be considered: a small open economy with perfect 
international capital mobility, and a closed economy. In the first case, 
Figure 2: OECD 
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developments in one country (such as ageing) lead to changes in the 
amount lent or borrowed on the international capital market, and to 
accompanying adjustments of the current account, leaving the interest rate 
unaffected. 
 In the second case, domestic investments are completely financed with 
domestic savings, so that the interest rate endogenously adjusts to equate 
supply and demand for capital and therefore depends heavily on national 
developments. As the size of the capital stock is determined by the 
availability of financial means, we discuss how national savings change in 
an ageing society and how this is influenced by different elements of the 
pension scheme and government policy with respect to the retirement age, 
pension reform, the creation of government debt and so forth. The other 
important element of the capital-labour ratio consists of the size of the 
active labour force, which is directly influenced by ageing (which decreases 
the number of workers), but also depends on government policy with 
respect to, for instance, early retirement programs. 
Figure 3: World 
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 Both cases are relevant for analysing the international capital-market 
effects of ageing. On the one hand, ageing is a global phenomenon, which 
justifies the closed-economy approach, all the more so if capital is not 
perfectly mobile between countries. On the other hand, the timing and 
extent of ageing differs between countries. To analyse the consequences of 
such asymmetric demographic shocks, the use of a small-open-economy 
model is more appropriate. 
 The second part of the paper focuses on international capital flows and 
spillover effects, assuming perfect capital mobility. Through these flows, 
developments in one country can influence factor prices, consumption, 
investment and ultimately the welfare of people in other countries. For 
instance, because ageing will have different consequences for the interest 
rate (depending on the size of the funded and unfunded components of 
pension schemes), it triggers international capital flows, thereby causing 
positive or negative spillover effects of ageing in one country on other 
countries. Another example of international spillover effects is the creation 
of government debt to finance higher public expenditures due to ageing, 
and the consequences this has for inflation in different countries of the 
EMU. Of course, the size of these effects depends on the actual degree of 
international capital mobility, which will also be discussed. 
 After the separate mechanisms have been reviewed, the focus will be on 
the expected quantitative effects of ageing on the return to capital in the 
coming decades. The size of these effects not only depends on the degree 
of capital mobility, but also hinges on the question whether the differences 
in timing and the extent of ageing between countries are sufficiently large 
for the model of a small open economy to be the most suitable approach. If 
not, then the scenario of a closed economy is more likely, in which case 
the retirement of the baby boom generation may lead to such a capital 
abundance and labour shortage that the interest rate drops dramatically. 
Will this lead to an asset meltdown? Or will rising economies such as China 
and India provide investment opportunities that are sufficiently favourable 
to attenuate the decrease in the return to capital? In order to answer these 
questions, we discuss the findings of recent studies that apply extensive 
computational models aiming to bring all previously discussed elements 
together to generate numerical simulation results for different scenarios. 
The paper ends with some policy implications. 
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2. The basic model  
This paper analyses how ageing affects international capital markets. 
Ageing is modeled as the result of two types of demographic shocks. The 
first is a decrease in population growth due to a fall in the fertility rate 
(i.e., the average number of children per woman). As illustrated in Figure 
4, fertility rates in many countries dropped sharply in the 1970s due to the 
introduction of contraceptives and the increased labour force participation 
of women. In up-coming decades, fertility rates are expected to remain 
below the reproduction rate of 2.1 children per woman. The second type of 
demographic shock that causes the ageing of the population is the ongoing 
increase in longevity due to better nutrition and better provision of health-
care. Figure 5 shows the development of life expectancy at birth between 
1955 and 2050. In the first half of the twentieth century, life expectancy 
increased mainly as a result of reduced rates in infant mortality. The 
current (and prospective) decline in mortality occurs mainly at old ages, 
however, which causes the ageing of populations. 
 This section presents the model that forms the basis for the paper’s 
analysis of the effects of demographic shocks. The first subsection describes 
Figure 4: Fertility rate (Source: United Nations Common Database (UNCDB), 2007 and own 
calculations. The figures for 2010 and later are based on the medium variant projection of the 
UN population division. 
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the production side of the economy and how changes in the relative 
scarcity of capital affect factor prices. Section 2.2 adds a life-cycle model for 
individual savings to this set-up by introducing the Diamond-Samuelson 
overlapping-generations model. The final subsection extends the model 
with a pension scheme. 
 
2.1 Ageing and the capital-labour ratio  
The central variable in our analysis of the effects of ageing is a country’s 
capital-labour ratio: the amount of capital relative to the amount of 
labour. This is the key variable because, given the neoclassical production 
function that is assumed (see Box 1), it determines factor prices (in a 
closed-economy setting) and/or international capital flows (in an open-
economy setting),1 and thus largely determines the welfare of current and 
future generations. 
                                                        
1 Throughout the paper we abstract from international labour mobility. Note that a 
combination of labour and capital mobility in one model does not lead to internal 
Figure 5: Longevity 
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 Only one good is produced (using capital and labour) that can be used as 
consumption or investment good, and is internationally tradeable. This 
implies that we ignore specialisation effects that may arise from 
international trade. Furthermore, this assumption implies that an 
individual demands the same commodity when young and old. Obviously, 
this is a strong assumption, considering the fact that the need for (non-
tradeable) services such as health-care increases with age. Population 
ageing will therefore affect not only the capital-labour ratio, but also the 
sectoral structure of the economy and the relative price of tradeables and 
non-tradeables. These modifications will briefly be addressed in the 
conclusion of Sections 3 and 4, respectively. 
 Labour is measured as the effective supply of labour in the economy, and 
thus depends on demographics, labour-market behaviour and labour 
efficiency. Although ageing may also affect the latter two elements of 
effective labour supply (for example through changes in retirement 
behaviour or investment in human capital over the lifetime), in view of the 
available space, we focus on the direct effects of demographic change on 
labour supply and pay little attention to the effects of ageing on labour 
market behaviour and labour efficiency (although some modifications are 
discussed at the end of Section 4). 
 The word capital in the capital-labour ratio refers to the amount of 
physical productive capital (such as machines and so forth) in the 
economy. This should be distinguished from financial capital (consisting of 
stocks, bonds and so forth), which is meant in case of international capital 
flows. However, the value of stocks is closely linked to the value of the 
physical capital stock: assuming free entry, no adjustment costs of 
(physical) capital and no asset bubbles, these are equal.2 The stock of 
physical capital is determined by past investment and depreciation. 
Investment is, in turn, strongly correlated with savings, which will be 
discussed in the next subsection. 
                                                                                                                      
solutions unless a third, immobile production factor is introduced The latter paper shows 
that allowing for labour mobility reinforces the consequences of international differences 
in demographics and policy, as labour tends to follow international capital flows. In 
general, the results are not qualitatively different. One important difference is, however, 
that labour mobility introduces the possibility of a globally welfare improving pension 
reform, which cannot be realised when only capital is mobile, see Section 5.2. 
2 That is, Tobin’s ‘q’ (i.e., the ratio of the market valuation of real capital and the 
replacement cost of these assets) equals one (Abel, 1979). 
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Box 1: The neoclassical production function 
Throughout this paper we assume a constant-returns-to-scale neoclassical 
production function (see for example Barro and Sala-i Martin, 2004, 
Section 1.2.2) with two factors of production: capital and labour. Production 
capacity is always fully utilized (so we abstract from Keynesian multiplier 
effects due to a lack of demand.) Production per labour efficiency unit y 
can then be described as a function of the capital-labour ratio k:  
  yt = f (kt ), f '(k)≡ dfdk >0, f ''(k)≡ d2 fdk2 <0                                  (1) 
The development of the capital-labour ratio is determined by investment 
and depreciation, but also by the growth of the effective labour supply g: a 
growing labour supply –ceteris paribus– decreases k: 
   kt+1 = kt −δkt + it1+ g                                                                  (2) 
where i is investment per labour unit and δ  stands for the depreciation 
rate of capital. So in a steady-state (where k is constant) investment 
equals3  i = (δ + g)k                                                                             (3)  
That is, the faster the effective labour force grows, the more a country has 
to invest per worker in order to equip each future worker with the same 
level of capital (machines). The return on capital (or interest rate) equals:  r = f '(kt )−δ                                                                          (4)  
The wage rate per labour efficiency unit is given by  wt = f (kt )− kt f '(kt )                                                               (5) 
In a closed economy, the capital-labour ratio is endogenously determined 
and determines the factor prices according to these equations. In a small 
open economy with perfect capital mobility, the interest rate cannot differ 
from the interest rate  r  on the world capital market. That is, capital flows 
into (out of) the country so as to realize  rt = r . Inserting this in the 
previous equations determines the capital-labour ratio and the wage rate. 
 
                                                        
3 Variables without a time subscript refer to the steady state. 
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2.2 Savings: the overlapping-generations model  
The dominant framework in the research on the economic effects of ageing 
combines the neoclassical production function with a life-cycle model for 
individual savings. According to the life-cycle model (Modigliani and 
Brumberg, 1954) consumption is determined by expected lifetime income. 
Thus, consumers borrow against future earnings during their early student- 
and working life (when income is low), they save during their most 
productive working years and they consume saved assets (including the 
return on these assets) during retirement.4 Here we use the simplest 
possible version of such a model, the Diamond-Samuelson two-
overlapping-generations model. 
 The novelty of the model introduced by Paul Samuelson in 1958 was the 
demographic structure. In this stylised framework, a new generation of 
individuals who live for exactly two periods (of equal length), is born 
during each period. The first period contains their industrious life, and in 
the second period they are retired. So in each period, two overlapping 
generations are alive: a young generation of workers and an old 
generation of retirees. Diamond (1965) generalised Samuelson’s framework. 
Contrary to Samuelson, Diamond assumed a store of value to be present, so 
that individuals have the opportunity to save for old age. This paper uses a 
version of the Diamond model that allows for changes in longevity and the 
fertility rate (see Box 2). 
                                                        
4 Attempts to test the life-cycle model against real-world data have met with mixed 
success. The main discrepancies between predicted and actual behaviour is that people 
drastically ‘underconsume’ early and late in their lifetime by failing to borrow against 
future earnings and not saving enough to adequately finance retirement incomes, 
respectively. People also seem to ‘overconsume’ during their highest earning years, and 
the elderly do not consume as much from their assets as would be expected. Specific 
alterations to the theory have been proposed to help it accommodate the data: a bequest 
motive, for example, and capital market imperfections (such as liquidity constraints). For 
an overview, see for example, Baranzini (2005). 
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Box 2: Longevity in the two-overlapping-generations model 
Let 
 
Nt be the number of young people in period t, which is assumed to 
grow at a constant growth rate of n so 
  Nt =Nt−1 1+ n( ) . A constant fraction 1− ε of each generation dies at the end of the first period of life, so the 
number of elderly in period t is 
  Mt = εNt−1 . As it is assumed that all young  
work and all elderly are retired, the old age dependency ratio, i.e., the 
number of retirees per worker in period t is given by 
  MtNt = εNt−1(1+ n)Nt−1 = ε1+ n  
It immediately follows that both a decrease in fertility (lower value of n) 
and an increase in longevity (higher value of n) raises the dependency 
ratio. The fact that individuals may die at the end of the first period of life 
implies that they may unintendedly leave amounts of wealth. We have to 
make assumptions on who receives this wealth. One could assume either 
that it goes to the next generation as an (unintended) bequest, or that it is 
allocated to the surviving members of the same generation. Here we 
assume for simplicity that perfect annuity markets exist and that the 
wealth of those who decease is transferred to the survivors of this 
generation in the form of a higher return on their savings. The budget 
constraint for the first period of life is:  
 
ct
y =wt − st  
                                                                 (6) 
and the budget constraint for the second period is:  
  cto = 1+ rt+1ε st                                                                           (7) 
where 
 
ct
y  and 
 
ct
o  indicate consumption of a young individual in period t  
and consumption of the same individual when old (i.e., in period t+1), 
respectively, and 
 
st  stands for savings in period t. Consumers maximize  
expected utility over the lifetime, where future utility is discounted at a 
rate ρ5:  
  EUt =u(cty )+ ε1+ ρ v(ct+1o )                                                         (8) 
                                                        
5 For convenience, we assume an additively separable lifetime utility function. 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The first-order condition for this problem is: 6 
  u'(ct
y )
v '(cto ) = 1+ rt+11+ ρ                                                                      (9) 
Savings by the young can be derived from this so-called Euler equation. 
The effect of a change in the interest rate on savings is the result of two 
opposing effects: a positive substitution effect and a negative income 
effect. Lifecycle models often assume that the income effect dominates and 
savings fall if the interest rate rises. In case logarithmic felicity functions7 
are assumed, both effects balance and savings per worker are independent 
of the interest rate:8 
  st = εwt1+ ε + ρ                                                                         (10) 
Note that the young save more if longevity increases 
   ∂s∂ε >0⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ , but that  
changes in fertility do not affect s. Savings by the young differ from 
aggregate national savings, which includes dissaving by the old and the 
net saving by firms and by the government. Abstracting from government 
budget deficits, aggregate national savings per worker equal: 
  stagg = st − st−11+ g +δk                                                              (11) 
It follows that(for a given capital-labour ratio) an increase in longevity 
raises aggregate savings in the steady state if the economy is growing.9  
A decrease in fertility lowers aggregate savings in the long run, however.  
So the total effect of ageing on aggregate savings is unclear. 
                                                                                                                      
6  u' cty( ) ≡ dudcty and   v ' ct+10( ) ≡ dvdct+10 . 
7 I.e.,
 
 u(c y )= ln(c y )  and  v(co )= ln(co )  
8 To be precise, we should use the term savings per labour efficiency unit instead of 
savings per worker. For expositional reasons, we prefer to loosely speak of savings, 
consumption etcetera per worker throughout this paper. As we assume exogenous labour 
supply, at a given point in time, i.e., with a given number of labour efficiency units, this 
does not make a difference. 
9 The same result is found by Sheshinski (2006) in a Blanchard-Yaari model, i.e., a model 
with an infinite number of overlapping generations where individuals at each point in 
time face a constant probability of death. 
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2.3 Savings and capital formation in a closed economy 
In a closed economy, the capital-labour in a given period is determined by 
the savings accumulated by the young in the previous period and by 
economic growth (see Box 3). An important result of Diamond’s analysis is 
that in a laissez-faire economy individuals can save ‘too much’, leading to 
an inefficiently high capital-labour ratio. That is, the economy may 
become dynamically inefficient, implying that consumption per worker can 
be increased for all generations if savings are reduced (see Box 4). In case 
of a dynamically inefficient economy, government intervention is necessary 
to reduce savings and attain a socially optimal allocation. The government 
might accomplish this by introducing a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension 
scheme (see Section 2.5). 
 
Box 3: Capital accumulation in a closed-economy model 
In a closed economy, the savings of the young equal the next period’s 
capital stock. Note that (assuming that each worker supplies a constant 
number of hours of labour) effective labour supply rises due to a growing 
number of young individuals (n) but also due to increasing labour 
productivity (x), so   1+ g= (1+ n)(1+ x) . This growth of effective labour 
supply leads to capital dilution. That is, for a given level of next period’s 
capital stock, a growing labour supply lowers next period’s capital-labour 
ratio. Therefore, the relation between savings by the young and next 
period’s capital labour ratio is:   st = (1+ g)kt+1                                                                         (12) 
From this we can derive the steady-state capital-labour ratio. In case of 
logarithmic felicity and a Cobb-Douglas production function   y = Akα (0<α <1)  an explicit expression results: 
  
A(1−α )(1+ g)(1+ 1+ ρ
ε
)
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
11−α
                                                           (13) 
From this expression it immediately follows that 
  ∂k∂g <0   and   ∂k∂ε >0    
implying that ageing leads to a higher capital-labour ratio. This holds for 
both an increase in longevity (higher value ε ) and a decrease in fertility 
(lower value of  n  and thus of g ). 
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Box 4: Golden rule and dynamic efficiency 
In a closed economy there is no import or export. In that case the 
difference between the production per worker and investment per worker 
equals consumption per worker. Figure 6 shows this consumption in the 
steady state as a function of the capital-labour ratio in the steady state. 
The consumption per worker reaches its maximum value if the marginal 
product of capital equals the marginal cost of capital in terms of additional 
investment required to maintain the capital stock, i.e., if   f '(k)=δ + g  or 
equivalently, if  r = g . This condition is called the golden rule of capital 
accumulation. An increase in the capital-labour ratio has two opposite 
effects on lifetime utility. First, more capital per worker implies a higher 
wage, which positively affects utility. Second, a higher capital-labour ratio 
implies a lower marginal product of capital and thus a lower interest rate, 
which lowers utility. For capital-labour ratios below the golden rule level, 
the positive wage effect dominates and increasing  raises lifetime utility.  
If  k is above the golden-rule level, the interest-rate effect dominates and 
further increasing  k lowers lifetime utility. At the golden-rule point, the 
two effects exactly cancel and steady-state lifetime utility is maximised: 
  dEUdk = u'(c y ) f ''(k)1+ r [s − k(1+ r)]=0                                        (14) 
In a closed economy, using (12) this reduces to 
  dEUdk = u'(c y )kf ''(k)1+ r [g− r]=0                                               (15) 
Steady-state levels of the capital-labour ratio above the golden-rule level 
(i.e.,
 
 r < g ) are called dynamically inefficient as long-run utility can be 
increased without harming generations in the short run, namely by 
consuming more and saving less. Capital-labour ratios below the golden-
rule level (where  r > g ) are called dynamically efficient because long-run 
consumption can only be increased by raising investment, that is, by 
increasing savings and thus lowering consumption in the short run. It is 
generally assumed that economies are dynamically efficient. For an 
empirical assessment of dynamic efficiency in the US, see Abel et al. (1989) 
and Barbie et al. (2004). Leonard and Prinzinger (2001) stress that the 
results for the US cannot be assumed to be true for all other countries;  
each economy needs to be examined separately. 
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2.4 The small open economy: International capital flows  
In a small open economy, international capital flows equate the return on 
capital to the return on the world capital market. As a consequence, the 
capital-labour ratio is determined on the world capital market (see Box 1) 
and investment is not necessarily equal to national savings. If savings 
exceed investment, then the small open economy has a surplus on the 
current account mirrored by a deficit on the capital account. This implies a 
flow of money out of the country to be invested abroad, leading to an 
increase in net foreign asset holdings. For the sake of exposition, we refer 
to this situation from now on as an outflow of capital.10 In the opposite 
case (i.e., when the small open economy has a current-account deficit and 
investment exceeds savings), we speak of an inflow of capital. 
 What are the welfare effects of this international capital mobility? It is 
often thought that open capital markets raise welfare, as capital flows are 
                                                        
10 Although financial assets actually flow into the country in this case. 
 
Figure 6: The Golden Rule 
 
panel  paper  15  28 
beneficial to both capital exporters (who find better investment 
opportunities abroad) and capital importers (who experience less scarcity 
of capital). This is not necessarily true however. Let’s compare the situation 
of a small economy with perfect capital mobility to the situation of the 
same small economy in autarky (i.e., when capital flows to or from the rest 
of the world are not possible). Suppose that in autarky the capital-labour 
ratio in the small economy is higher than in the rest of the world. That is, 
the return on capital in the small economy is lower than it is abroad, and 
allowing for capital mobility would lead to an outflow of capital to the rest 
of world. This would indeed be good for domestic capital owners, as they 
would earn a higher return. However, the outflow of capital would also 
imply a lower capital-labour ratio in the small open economy and thus a 
lower wage rate compared to the situation in autarky. This is clearly a 
disadvantage for domestic workers. Because a consumer is both worker 
when young and capital owner when old, the net effect of capital mobility 
on his welfare in the long run is ambiguous and depends on whether the 
wage effect dominates the interest-rate effect (or the other way around). 
As shown in Box 4, this is determined by the capital-labour ratio in the 
economy in autarky: The wage effect dominates the interest-rate effect 
and an outflow of capital reduces welfare if (and only if) this economy is 
dynamically efficient (i.e., if its capital-labour ratio is below the golden-
rule level). That is, an outflow of capital raises long-run welfare only if the 
economy is dynamically inefficient in autarky. By the same reasoning, an 
inflow of capital raises welfare if the economy is dynamically efficient in 
autarky, but lowers welfare in case of dynamic inefficiency. 
 Capital mobility may thus be beneficial, but it may also be a burden, 
depending on the initial situation. The reason that the opening up of a 
country does not necessarily improve welfare is that only one good is 
produced, which implies that international trade and financial mobility do 
not expand the consumption set of consumers and that there are no 
potential gains from specialisation.11 
 
                                                        
11 The same holds in a two-country model. Buiter (1981) was the first to extend the 
overlapping-generations model to an open economy with two countries. He shows that 
the welfare effects of integration crucially depend on whether or not the economies are 
dynamically efficient. Just like in the small-open-economy model, it is not necessarily 
true that both economies gain from integration. See also Section 6.3. 
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2.5 Pensions in the Diamond-Samuelson framework  
This section extends the standard Diamond-Samuelson framework by 
introducing pensions. The first part briefly discusses funded pensions. 
However, as funded pensions are implicitly already part of the standard 
model, the largest part of this section is devoted to unfunded pensions and 
their effect on savings. 
 
Funded pensions 
Funded pensions can easily be included in the Diamond-Samuelson 
framework: in principle, all savings by the young are savings for old age. It 
may be assumed that part of these savings is determined by a pension 
fund. Note, however, that we have assumed perfect annuity markets. 
Therefore, as long as the pension fund does not redistribute within or 
between generations, and as long as these forced savings do not exceed 
the amount that the young would voluntarily save anyway, this does not 
change anything. Consequently, funded defined-contribution schemes 
(i.e., funded schemes where the benefit is completely determined by the 
return on individual contributions) do not really introduce new features 
into the model. Funded pension schemes with a defined benefit include 
elements of redistribution and may thus add new elements to our model. 
Note, however, that intragenerational redistribution cannot be analysed in 
our simple model because it assumes that all individuals of one generation 
are identical. Therefore, only the intergenerational redistribution by 
funded defined-benefit schemes can be included in our model. This is 
formally equivalent to introducing a PAYG scheme, however. That is, a 
funded defined-benefit scheme can be viewed as a combination of a 
funded defined-contribution scheme and a PAYG system. Because the 
latter will be discussed below, and (as explained above) the former does 
not add much to the model, we keep things simple and do not explicitly 
model pension funds. 
 In some countries, the fiscal treatment of pension savings differs from 
that of ordinary household savings. The Netherlands, for example, has the 
so-called EET regime ("omkeerregel"), which makes contributions to e.g., 
pension funds income-tax deductible. Also the returns to pension fund 
investments are not taxed, but the pension benefits that are eventually 
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received are subject to income taxation.12 Because people often face a 
lower tax rate when retired than when working, this implies a gain in 
lifetime income. The effect of having an EET regime on individual 
(retirement) savings is ambiguous. On the one hand, the income gain 
occurs later in life, which induces people to save less in order to smooth 
consumption (income effect). On the other hand, the effective tax rate is 
lower after retirement, which has a positive effect on savings (substitution 
effect). But even if there is no difference in tax rates when working and 
retired, the effective tax rate on capital income is lower with an EET 
regime: the interest received on savings is exempt from taxation until 
retirement, which allows the individual to reinvest the full amount of 
capital income received, yielding interest in the next period. The total 
amount of tax paid over the lifetime is therefore lower with an EET 
regime.13 Again, the effect on individual savings depends on the size of the 
income effect relative to the substitution effects. Because these work in 
opposite directions, it is unclear beforehand what the total effect is. The 
consequences for aggregate savings will be discussed briefly in Section 6.2; 
apart from that, we refrain from discussing the fiscal treatment of 
retirement savings in the rest of the paper. 
 
Unfunded pensions 
We extend the standard Diamond-Samuelson model with a PAYG pension 
scheme. That is, the government runs a balanced-budget redistribution 
scheme that transfers money in a lump-sum fashion from the young 
generation to the old generation living in the same period. Various types of 
PAYG schemes are possible.  
 
• Defined-contribution or defined-benefit schemes 
With regard to demographic changes, it is important to know if and how 
the contributions to the scheme are adjusted, as this determines which 
generation bears the risk of demographic changes. For a defined-
contribution scheme, the contribution rates are not adjusted to 
demographic shocks, implying that benefits will fall if ageing raises the 
                                                        
12 Other countries that have such a regime include Germany, the UK and the US. France, 
however, has a TTE regime: contributions and investment income are taxed, but benefits 
are exempted. 
13 Put differently, the net interest rate is higher. It can be shown that an EET regime is 
more efficient than ordinary income taxation, which includes capital income. 
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dependency ratio (i.e., the number of retirees per worker). For a defined-
benefit system, however, the young generation bears the burden of the 
demographic risk, and ageing will lead to rising contribution rates. 
 
• Bismarckian or Beveridgean PAYG schemes 
In general, PAYG contributions distort labour supply decisions and thus lead 
to a welfare loss, what is known as the excess burden. The reason is that 
contributing to a scheme generally does not imply entitlement to an 
actuarially fair benefit when old. This welfare loss is larger in a 
Beveridgean PAYG scheme (with no link between the amount of 
contributions paid and the benefit received when old) than in a 
Bismarckian PAYG scheme (where benefits are directly linked to the 
contributions paid). However, because in a dynamically efficient economy 
the present value of the benefits falls short of the contributions, a 
distortion of the labour-supply decision remains.14 The simple model 
presented below abstracts from labour-market distortions: labour supply is 
exogenous, and PAYG contributions thus do not cause an excess burden.15 
 
The Aaron condition 
As shown by Feldstein (1974, 1996), PAYG schemes reduce savings and thus 
the capital-labour ratio, which in a dynamically efficient closed economy 
decreases lifetime utility in the long run. In a small open economy, where 
the capital-labour ratio is determined on the world capital market, this 
effect is absent, of course. Instead, the decrease in savings implies an 
increase in foreign debt.16 The effect of a PAYG scheme on lifetime income 
and utility in a small open economy with given factor prices was analysed 
in a seminal paper by Aaron (1966). For a given tax rate, this effect depends 
on the interest rate ( r ) and the growth of effective labour supply ( g ). The 
PAYG scheme raises (lowers) lifetime income and utility if the internal rate 
of return of the PAYG scheme, (
  1+gε ) exceeds (falls short of) the rate of return on private savings (
  1+rε ). The resulting condition  r < g  is known as the Aaron condition (see Box 5), which is similar to the condition for 
dynamic inefficiency (see Box 4). Note that this does not imply that a 
                                                        
14 For the definition and an empirical assessment of the tax rates implied in PAYG 
schemes in various countries, see Fenge and Werding (2004). 
15 Endogenous labour supply is discussed briefly in the conclusion of Section 4. 
16 Nielsen (1994) shows that a PAYG scheme leads to higher foreign indebtedness in a 
Blanchard-Yaari type of overlapping generations model. 
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pension reform that involves a transition of (a part of) the PAYG scheme 
into a funded scheme produces net gains (see Section 5.2 for further 
discussion). 
 
Box 5: PAYG pensions in the Samuelson-Diamond model 
Workers pay a tax τ  on wage income w that is used for transfers to the 
currently living old. The remaining wage income is used for savings for old 
age  (st )  and for consumption while young:   cty = (1−τ )w − st                                                                     (16) 
When old, the individual consumes her savings, including the returns, and 
the transfer payment η  from the government. Consequently, the old-age 
consumption of an individual born at the beginning of period t is given by 
  ct=1o = 1+ rε st +η                                                                     (17) 
The government runs the transfer system as a PAYG scheme with the 
following (balanced) budget constraint, 
  η = (1+ g)τwε                                                                         (18) 
The Euler equation (eq. 9) is not affected by the introduction of pensions 
and assuming logarithmic utility, individual savings are now equal to: 
  st = ε1+ ρ + εw 1− (ε(1+ r)+ (1+ ρ)(1+ g)ε(1+ r) τ⎡⎣⎢ ⎤⎦⎥                           (19) 
Note that the PAYG scheme unambiguously reduces savings by the young 
   dsdτ <0⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟  as stressed by Feldstein (1974). We can derive the following 
equations for consumption: 
  cty = 1+ ρ1+ ρ + ε w − τ(r − g)1+ r⎡⎣⎢ ⎤⎦⎥                                                    (20) 
  ct+1o = 1+ r1+ ρ + ε w − τ(r − g)1+ r⎡⎣⎢ ⎤⎦⎥                                                   (21) 
where the term between brackets can be interpreted as lifetime income 
(i.e., the present value of all net income when young and old). It directly 
follows that the introduction of the PAYG scheme raises (lowers) lifetime 
income (and thereby consumption when young and old and lifetime utility) 
if  r < g(r > g) . This is known as the Aaron condition. 
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International policy coordination 
As mentioned above, in a small open economy, a PAYG scheme reduces 
savings but does not affect factor prices. Instead, it reduces the net flow of 
capital to other countries. Of course, in a world consisting of a large 
number of identical small open economies, this reduces the supply of 
capital at a global level resulting in a lower capital-labour ratio. This effect 
is typically neglected, however, by the individual small open economy. As 
stressed by Pemberton (1999) this implies that PAYG pensions in a small 
open economy produce a negative externality because of their effect on the 
world factor prices. Pemberton shows that, because of this external effect 
(which is neglected when countries decide individually), the gains from 
coordination of the PAYG policy between small open economies are 
potentially significant as coordination would lead to a higher capital-
labour ratio. A comparable result can be found in Pestieau et al. (2006) 
who analyse the optimal design of the pension scheme in a model with 
heterogeneous agents, perfect capital mobility and a variable number of 
symmetric economies ranging from one (closed economy or perfect 
coordination) to infinity (small open economy without coordination). They 
show that the size of the PAYG scheme rises and the capital-labour ratio 
falls as the number of countries increases, i.e., as coordination becomes 
weaker.17 
                                                        
17 Beltrametti and Bonatti (2004) reach the opposite conclusion: In their model, 
coordination depresses the capital-labour ratio. The reason for this different result is that 
(in contrast to for example Pemberton (1999), Beltrametti and Bonatti (2004)) they assume 
that the government also takes the future well-being of the current active generation into 
account. 
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3. Ageing in a small open economy  
 
To set the stage, we discuss the long-run effect of ageing in a small open 
economy without PAYG pensions. First, ageing is modeled as an increase in 
longevity. Subsequently, we discuss the effect of a permanent decrease in 
fertility.18 We focus on the effect on consumption possibilities. Of course, 
changes in consumption possibilities are an important determinant of 
changes in lifetime utility, but these are not necessarily the same. An 
increase in life expectancy, for example, may have a positive effect on 
utility, independent of the effect on consumption, just because of the joy 
of living longer. Such direct effects of demographic changes on utility are 
excluded from the analysis in this paper. 
 
3.1 Rising longevity  
An increase in longevity implies that wage income earned has to be spread 
over a longer expected lifetime. As a consequence, workers will save more 
and reduce consumption when young and consume less during retirement. 
The increase in savings by the young initially strongly boosts aggregate 
savings. In the long run, however, dissaving by the old also rises, which 
tempers the increase in aggregate savings. But as long as young cohorts are 
larger than old cohorts, the net effect on aggregate savings is positive (see 
Box 2). 
 In the small open economy, the capital-labour ratio and the factor 
rewards are determined on the world capital market. The increase in 
savings by the young therefore does not affect these variables, but only 
leads to an increase in net exports and a surplus on the current account. 
The current-account surplus implies a flow of capital to the rest of the 
world (i.e., net foreign asset holdings increase). When retired, the agents 
will sell their net foreign asset holdings and use the returns for extra 
imports (and thus extra consumption). In the long run, the increase in 
imports for old-age consumption outweighs the increase in exports due to 
the higher savings (and thus lower consumption) by the young, so that the 
net export of the small open economy falls (and may even become 
negative). The negative effect of the lower net export on the current 
                                                        
18 To keep things simple, we assume that there is no effect on labour market behaviour 
and labour efficiency. Moreover, we abstract from uncertainty and credit constraints, and 
assume perfect foresight. 
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account is counteracted by the positive effect of the net interest received 
from abroad on the additional net foreign asset holdings, so that the net 
foreign asset holdings per capita stabilise at the new, higher level. 
 In the long run, therefore, ageing transforms the small open economy 
into a rentier economy that invests its capital in the world capital market 
to import consumption goods when old. While this rentier effect raises 
consumption possibilities, it is not sufficient to prevent a decrease in 
average per capita consumption. 
 Figure 7 presents the long-run effect of an increase in longevity in the 
small open economy. The solid line represents the per capita average 
domestically produced amount of consumption as a function of the 
capital-labour ratio. For a given dependency ratio (i.e., a given number of 
elderly per worker), this is proportional to the consumption curve for the 
closed economy presented in Figure 6.19 The actual per capita consumption 
is determined by the point on this curve that corresponds to the capital-
labour ratio that is determined on the international capital market ( k = k
∗ ). 
In the long run, the increase in longevity has two effects. First, due to the 
rentier effect net imports rise, which raises consumption above the 
domestically produced level of consumption. Second, the dependency ratio 
increases, implying that the consumption per worker has to be shared with 
more retirees. Hence, this dependency-ratio effect decreases average per 
capita consumption. It can easily be shown that the latter effect dominates 
the former, implying that increasing longevity lowers per capita average 
consumption in a small open economy. 
 
3.2 Decreasing fertility  
Now we assume that longevity is constant but that fertility decreases (i.e., 
 n  falls). In the absence of intergenerational redistribution, a change in 
fertility in a small open economy with given factor prices affects neither 
individual consumption nor savings levels. Still, several macroeconomic 
effects can be discerned. In particular, the increase in the relative size of 
the dissaving old cohort implies that aggregate savings fall. This is indeed 
what is found in most cross-country aggregate studies of savings behaviour 
(for an overview, see Bosworth et al. (2004)). Empirical studies of micro 
                                                        
19 For expositional reasons we assume that in the initial situation the net export equals 
zero, so that actual per capita consumption per worker coincides with domestically 
produced per capita consumption. 
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data do not always confirm that aggregate savings fall when fertility 
decreases. As noted by Miles (1999), this may well be due to the fact that in 
these studies savings rates are generally constructed from the difference 
between measured income and measured consumption at the micro level. 
This overestimates savings by the elderly, as income from a funded pension 
is income for the individual, but represents dissaving on a macroeconomic 
level. A recent cohort analysis of US household-level data by Dynan et al. 
(2009) suggests that savings rates from micro data are roughly consistent 
with aggregate time-series data. 
 Apart from the effect on savings, decreasing fertility has another 
important macroeconomic effect: a smaller labour force implies that less 
investment is needed to stabilise the capital-labour ratio at the given level 
and –ceteris paribus– more resources become available for consumption.  
The importance of the demographic influence on investment was 
emphasized in a seminal paper by Cutler et al. (1990).20 This adds a third 
effect, the positive capital-thickening effect, to the dependency-ratio 
                                                        
20 For an empirical study of the effect of demographics on investment, see, for example 
Higgins (1998). 
Figure 7: An increase in longevity in a small open economy 
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effect and the rentier effect described above. The net result of these three 
effects on average per capita consumption is ambiguous: per capita 
average consumption increases if consumption when young is smaller than 
consumption when old. Figure 8 illustrates this case. 
 
3.3 Conclusion and modifications 
In the long run, both a decrease in fertility and an increase in longevity 
transform the small open economy into a rentier economy that invests its 
capital in the world capital market to finance the import of consumption 
goods. This helps to moderate the negative effects of ageing on 
consumption. 
 Higgins (1998) combines empirical analyses of national savings and 
investment rates to project the effect of changes in the demographic 
structure on the current-account balances of a number of countries. 
Although there are significant differences between countries, he finds that 
ageing pushes countries towards current-account surpluses. In reality, 
however, this rentier effect may not be as strong as the small-open-
economy model suggests. For example, capital may not be as mobile 
internationally as the model assumes (see Section 7). Also, the switch to a 
Figure 8: An decrease in fertility in a small open economy 
 
 
panel  paper  15  38 
rentier economy may have effects on the structure of the economy that are 
not included in our simple model. If, for example, the economy is 
comprised of two sectors of production (one producing labour-intensive 
services that are not internationally tradeable and another producing 
tradeable capital-intensive commodities), then the switch to a rentier 
economy will be accompanied with a switch to a more service-oriented 
economy. This may lead to a form of "Dutch disease" and hamper 
innovation and economic growth (see e.g., Van Groezen et al. (2005)). As 
shown by Bettendorf and Dewachter (2007), demographic changes may also 
affect the price of tradeable relative to non-tradeable goods, leading to  
effects that cannot be analysed in our simple model.21 In the same vein, 
Sadka and Tanzi (1998) point to the real exchange-rate risk confronting 
pension funds. This risk is absent if governments adopt an exchange-rate 
policy aimed at maintaining purchasing power parity, as we implicitly 
assume in our model. However, a government may not strictly adhere to 
such a policy if ageing leads to a large outflow of capital, transforming the 
economy into a rentier economy. The most important problem with the 
small-open-economy model is, however, that ageing is actually a global 
phenomenon (see Figures 4 and 5). If many countries start to lend capital 
to the international capital market, then the interest rate will fall and the 
assumption of given factor prices will no longer hold. Therefore, we now 
analyse ageing in a closed economy, which takes account of all general-
equilibrium effects. 
                                                        
21 If, for example, in a two-sector Blanchard-Yaari overlapping-generations model, non-
traded goods are used for investment purposes, then the increasing marginal cost of 
production in the non-traded sector implies economy-wide adjustment costs of 
investment that affect the adjustment path after a demographic shock, see Bettendorf and 
Heijdra (2006). 
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4. Ageing in a closed economy  
 
This section discusses the long-run effects of ageing in a closed economy. 
As in this model the effects of a decrease in fertility and an increase in 
longevity are qualitatively the same, we present only the former case. We 
first analyse the effects when there are no PAYG pensions. Subsequently, 
we discuss how the conclusions change if a PAYG scheme is assumed. 
 
4.1 No PAYG pensions  
The effects of ageing in a closed economy are illustrated in Figure 6. In 
contrast to a small open economy, the closed economy cannot invest its 
additional savings abroad to moderate the negative effects of ageing. So 
there is no rentier effect on the consumption possibility curve but only a 
capital-thickening effect and a dependency-ratio effect. In general, the 
net result of both effects is ambiguous. However, it can easily be 
established that in case of a Diamond-Samuelson model without 
intergenerational transfers, for a given capital-labour ratio, the net effect 
on average per capita consumption is negative if the economy is 
dynamically efficient (Meijdam and Verbon, 1997, proposition 2). 
 In contrast to the small open economy, in a closed economy, the capital-
labour ratio is not determined exogenously but depends on the savings 
decisions, so we can now have shifts along the consumption possibility 
curve. In particular, if ageing leads to higher savings, this will increase the 
capital-labour ratio, which (assuming dynamic efficiency) raises 
consumption per worker in the long run. The decrease in average per 
capita consumption possibilities for a given capital-labour ratio indeed 
implies that consumption when young falls and that savings and the 
capital-labour ratio rise (cf. eq. 13). This capital-deepening effect implies a 
shift along the consumption possibility curve to the right in Figure 8, and 
thus raises the consumption possibilities per worker. It can easily be shown 
that this increase in consumption possibilities dominates the other effects. 
That is, the net result of the dependency-ratio effect, the capital-
thickening effect and the capital-deepening effect on consumption 
possibilities (and thus on lifetime utility) is positive (Heijdra and van der 
Ploeg, 2002, section 17.2.3). This result for the two-overlapping-generations 
models is confirmed by simulation studies using more detailed models with 
large numbers of overlapping generations (see for example Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff, 1987, Ch. 11). Moreover, Heijdra and Ligthart (2006) find the same 
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result for a Blanchard-Yaari type of overlapping-generations model. So we 
can conclude that in a dynamically efficient closed economy without 
unfunded pensions, ageing raises the capital-labour ratio and thus welfare 
in the long run. 
 
4.2 PAYG pensions  
The conclusion that ageing raises welfare in a closed economy because it 
raises the capital-labour ratio may change, however, if there is a PAYG 
pension scheme. Then, the negative dependency-ratio effect is larger than 
without pensions as, due to the PAYG transfers, the consumption of retirees 
is relatively large (i.e., the downward shift of the consumption curve is 
larger than in Figure 6). Another way of interpreting this is that ageing now 
has an additional negative effect, as it reduces the implicit rate of return to 
the PAYG contributions. 
 On the other hand, in case of fixed contributions to the PAYG scheme, the 
lower implicit rate of return of this scheme implies that PAYG benefits will 
fall and the incentive to save for old age will rise. So the capital-labour 
Figure 9: An decrease in fertility in a closed economy 
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ratio rises more, and the positive capital-deepening effect is reinforced 
(the shift to the right is larger than indicated in Figure 6). Adding all of the 
effects shows that the total net effect of ageing on welfare is ambiguous 
when PAYG contributions are fixed: if the size of the PAYG transfer is 
sufficiently large, then the negative effects will dominate the positive 
effects of a lower fertility, and lifetime utility will fall (Heijdra and van der 
Ploeg, 2002, section 17.2.3). 
 In case of a pension scheme with defined benefits, the total effect of a 
decrease in fertility on long-run welfare is more likely to be negative than 
with fixed contributions. The reason is that ageing now raises the PAYG 
contributions. That is, the inefficient PAYG scheme is extended and for a 
given level of savings, consumption when young falls and consumption 
when retired remains unchanged. Individuals will compensate this by 
saving less. As a consequence, the capital-labour ratio rises less (or may 
even fall). So there will be a weak capital deepening or none at all. Adema 
(2008, Appendix 2B) shows that for reasonable parameter values there is a 
positive capital-deepening effect if fertility falls.22 In general, however, 
this is not strong enough to prevent a decrease in utility. 
 In case of an increase in longevity instead of a decrease in fertility, the 
positive capital-thickening effect is absent and the total effect on utility is 
more likely to be negative. 
 
4.3 Conclusion and modifications  
We can conclude that in a closed economy without PAYG pensions, ageing 
in the long run raises the capital-labour ratio, which increases 
consumption and utility. The existence of a PAYG scheme weakens this 
positive effect of ageing on the capital-labour ratio in a closed economy 
and, if the system is extensive, it may even cause consumption and utility 
to fall. 
 
Modifications 
Of course, also in a closed-economy ageing may have effects on the sector 
structure of the economy that are not included in our simple model. Van 
Groezen et al. (2007), for example, show that in a two-sector economy 
                                                        
22 If, e.g.,    f (k)= k0.3 , a period is 30 years, capital depreciates at 5% per year, time 
preference is 1% per year, and   ε = 0.94 , then the capital-deepening effect is positive as 
long as the PAYG tax is below 55% of the wage rate. 
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where the elderly consume a relatively large share of labour intensive 
services, ageing leads to wage increases, which raises the relative price of 
services. This inflation implies a decrease in the real return on savings. 
Consumers react to this with an extra increase in savings, which makes 
dynamic inefficiency more likely to prevail, especially if people strongly 
prefer a smooth pattern of consumption over their lifetime. 
 Another element that by construction is absent in our two-overlapping-
generations model is age-related demand for assets: workers, as they grow 
older, may systematically vary their investment portfolio. If these age-
related preferences remain constant over time, then shifts in the age 
composition of the population can have important effects on demand for 
different kinds of assets. These shifts in relative demand may affect asset 
prices and relative returns of different asset classes. An important example 
of this effect is the effect of ageing on housing demand and house prices, 
as studied in Mankiw and Weil (1989) for the US. They concluded that the 
two-decade rise in home prices starting in the late 1960s was mainly 
driven by the entry of the large baby-boom generation into age groups in 
which housing demand was rising rapidly. They forecasted a substantial 
long-term decline in home prices after 1980. Bosworth et al. (2004) show 
that for many years this prediction proved incorrect, as since the beginning 
of the 1990s the real price of homes sharply increased, while the 
demographic housing demand as calculated by Mankiw and Weil 
decreased. By now, we know that this may not have been more than a 
temporary bubble, and that the demographic fundamentals of the housing 
market may be more important than seemed to be the case in 2004. A 
second important channel of influence of the population age structure on 
asset prices is the relation between age and the share of the portfolio held 
in risky assets: it is generally believed that the older a person gets, the 
more risk averse (s)he becomes. Evidence for this was found by, e.g. Riley 
and Chow (1992), Bashki and Chen (1994), and Pålsson (1996). As a 
consequence, this would imply that the optimal share of wealth invested 
in risky assets decreases with age (see for example De Jong et al., 
2008). Bosworth et al. (2004) report mixed evidence for this. However, 
other studies such as Poterba (2001) and Davis and Li (2003) point out the 
effect that the age structure of the population has on asset prices and 
returns; they find that the fraction of young people has a significantly 
positive effect on real equity prices. This relation between age structure 
and asset prices or asset returns is not included in our model. For a simple 
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stochastic overlapping-generations model that can be used to analyse this 
relation, see Geanakoplos et al. (2004). This model predicts that the price-
earnings ratio should be proportional to the ratio of middle-aged to young 
adults, while the real rates of return on equity and bonds should be an 
increasing function of the change in this ratio. The authors compare the 
results of their model to the stylised facts on the US bond and equity 
markets in the past century. They find that the price-earnings ratio and the 
rate of return on equity fit the predictions quite well. The behaviour of the 
real interest rate departs much more from the model prediction and only 
after 1965 is significantly correlated with demographic developments. 
 If older individuals prefer to hold less risky assets, one would expect that 
a rise in the average age of the population would increase the risk 
premium between stocks and bonds. The findings of the very few papers 
that investigate this relationship often contradict each other. Bashki and 
Chen (1994), for example, confirm the above hypothesis and find that a rise 
in the average age increases the risk premium in the United States. Using a 
stochastic four-period OLG model, Brooks (2002) finds that the equity 
premium declines in the early stage of a ‘baby boom’ and then increases 
when the large cohort is old. The stochastic model of Geanakoplos et al. 
(2004) predicts, however, that the equity premium is smaller when the 
population of savers is older. This result is confirmed by Ang and 
Maddaloni (2005), who point out that the relationship between population 
age structure and the risk premium differs between countries. They show 
that the pattern that is found for the United States by Bashki and Chen 
(1994) does not extend to other countries. Pooling international data, they 
find that faster growth in the fraction of retired people decreases the risk 
premium. The model used in this paper is a deterministic model that 
features no difference in asset returns; we will therefore not analyse the 
effects of ageing on the risk premium. 
 Also, we have assumed labour supply to be exogenous. With endogenous 
labour supply, ageing affects the size of the labour force not only directly, 
but also indirectly via the labour-supply decision of the young. Ageing will 
–ceteris paribus– have an upward effect on the capital-labour ratio and 
gross wage. On the one hand, this stimulates individuals to supply more 
labour because it is more rewarding (substitution effect); on the other 
hand, with a certain number of hours worked, a person already earns 
more, allowing that individual to enjoy more leisure time without a drop in 
income (income effect). Depending on which of these two effects 
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dominates, labour supply increases or decreases after a rise in the wage 
rate. Overall, most empirical research23 has found labour-supply elasticities 
close to zero for breadwinners, implying that both effects cancel out, which 
justifies our assumption of exogenous labour supply. For other categories, 
such as partners of breadwinners, the substitution has been found to 
dominate. In that case, labour supply will increase after a rise of the wage 
rate. This will dampen the effect of ageing on the capital-labour ratio. Of 
course, the design of the pension scheme (and pension reform) plays an 
important role too. If a country has a large PAYG scheme with defined 
benefits, then ageing leads to higher contribution rates and lower net 
wages. If this effect dominates, labour supply can actually decrease. But in 
case of defined contributions, ageing leads to lower (future) benefits, 
which stimulates labour supply when young, depending on the degree of 
actuarial fairness. The extent to which it matters whether or not one allows 
for endogenous labour supply can be shown with numerical calculations; 
this will be discussed in Section 8.2. 
 Finally, note that in our model labour supply is measured in labour-
efficiency units, implying that labour supply is affected not only by changes 
in supply in hours, but also by changes in labour productivity. Labour 
productivity is assumed to grow at an exogenous constant rate. However, 
ageing may affect productivity through various channels. For example, the 
increase in wages caused by ageing may incite firms to invest more in 
labour-augmenting technological progress, which would partly offset the 
increase in labour scarcity. On the other hand, labour productivity of older 
workers may be lower than that of young workers, so that an increase in 
the average age of workers due to ageing may lower average labour 
productivity.24 Also, older workers may be less willing to accept new 
technologies (see Canton et al., 2002). Finally, as mentioned above, ageing 
may cause a shift in the structure of the economy towards more service 
production. If technological development in the labour-intensive service 
sector is lower than that in the capital-intensive commodity sector, this 
will lead to lower productivity growth (Van Groezen et al. (2005)). 
                                                        
23 See e.g. Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for an overview. 
24 For an overview of the literature on the relation between age and productivity, see for 
example Euwals et al. (2009). 
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5. Policy reactions to ageing  
 
Our analysis thus far has explored the effect of demographic shocks, taking 
the pension scheme as given. That is, we have not taken into account 
policy reactions to the ageing of the population. This section discusses the 
effects of various policy reactions. First, we present the effects of 
exogenous policy changes in reaction to ageing (including a (partial) 
replacement of the PAYG scheme by funded pensions, an increase in 
government debt, and stimulating labour-market participation). Second, 
we discuss the effects of demographic shocks in models where 
intergenerational redistribution is endogenous. That is, we analyse ageing 
in models with altruism, where decisions on intergenerational transfers 
(including not only PAYG pensions and government debt, but also 
bequests) follow from intertemporal optimisation by a dynasty or a 
government. 
 
5.1 Government debt  
The increase in the old-age dependency ratio caused by ageing puts 
pressure on the government budget. If strong reductions in benefits for the 
elderly are to be prevented, the intergenerational transfers that exist not 
only within the pension scheme but also in health-care and so forth imply 
that tax rates will have to rise. Governments have some freedom in 
choosing the timing of taxation, however. That is, governments may use 
government debt to roll over part of the burden to future generations. 
Although this may be done for purely political reasons, it may also be 
motivated by efficiency reasons, especially in case of a temporary 
demographic shock (like a baby boom). It is well known that it is efficient 
to smooth tax rates over time (Barro, 1979). This implies that a government 
should raise its debt when a temporary increase occurs in the dependency 
ratio. It also implies, however, that it should immediately raise taxes and 
lower its debt when a future increase in the dependency ratio is 
anticipated.25 
 The effect of a higher public debt on the capital-labour ratio (in a closed 
economy) or on international capital flows (in a small open economy) 
                                                        
25 The creation of a saving fund for PAYG pensions like the so-called ‘AOW-fonds’ in the 
Netherlands may also be interpreted as a temporary decrease in net government debt. 
This also holds for the US Social Security Trust Fund (if revenues exceed payments), which 
is used to buy government bonds. 
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depends crucially on the extent to which private savings react. If citizens 
are fully aware that a higher public debt implies higher future taxes, and 
in response they increase their savings by the same amount as the rise in 
public debt, then Ricardian equivalence (Barro, 1974) asserts that there will 
be no effect on national savings. Consequently, the capital-labour ratio or 
net foreign asset holdings will not be affected. However, Ricardian 
equivalence requires a very restrictive set of assumptions to hold.26 
Empirical research generally rejects Ricardian equivalence, although some 
studies have found Ricardian effects in saving behaviour.27 
 If public debt increases without an equally large increase in private 
savings, this will lead to crowding out of the private capital (i.e., a lower 
capital-labour ratio, or a negative effect on net foreign asset holdings). 
Assuming dynamic efficiency, future utility will be lower in both cases. So, 
without an equally large increase in private savings, the creation of 
government debt implies intergenerational redistribution of welfare: 
current generations gain due to lower taxes, but the welfare of future 
generations will be lower. It is interesting to note that in a closed economy 
the lower capital-labour ratio that results if government debt is increased, 
implies lower wages and a higher return on capital. This is advantageous 
for the position of pension funds offering a defined-benefit pension (like 
many Dutch occupational pension schemes do). In the same vein, lowering 
public debt (or introducing saving funds for PAYG pensions) in view of 
anticipated ageing worsens the position of defined-benefit pension funds 
(Sadka and Tanzi, 1998). This effect on factor prices is of course absent in a 
small open economy. However, as noted by (Sadka and Tanzi, 1998), the 
effect of changes in government debt on the real exchange rate may have 
comparable results for the position of defined-benefit pension funds. 
 
5.2 Pension reform  
In view of the rising dependency ratio and the resulting decrease in the 
rate of return of the PAYG scheme, many countries are considering pension 
reform (i.e., a (partial) replacement of the PAYG scheme by funded 
pensions). This could take several forms. Within the existing pension 
scheme, public pensions (the so-called ‘first pillar’) could be reduced, 
                                                        
26 For example, it requires generations to be sufficiently altruistic towards future 
generations (see Section 5.4); this is not a usual assumption in 2-OLG models. 
27 For a review of the literature on Ricardian equivalence, see for example Briotti (2005). 
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while at the same time private, collectively arranged pensions (the ‘second 
pillar’, often managed by pension funds) could be increased. Alternatively, 
the reduction of public pensions could be accompanied by an increase in 
private savings by individuals (such as the 401(k) plans and IRA accounts in 
the US). Such a reform raises not only savings by the young, but also 
(assuming a growing number of young individuals) aggregate savings. In a 
small open economy, this results in a flow of capital to the rest of the 
world. In a closed-economy setting, it raises the capital-labour ratio. As is 
evident from the Aaron condition, assuming dynamic efficiency, this raises 
the welfare of the currently young and future generations. However, 
without supplementary policies, it harms the elderly during the transition. 
 The government may want to compensate the elderly in case of a 
pension reform. This is possible via the creation of government debt. As 
explained above, if Ricardian equivalence does not hold, then government 
debt implies intergenerational redistribution of welfare. Consequently, if 
the elderly during the transition are compensated, then the gains from the 
pension reform for current and future generations of young people will be 
lower. A pension reform would be very attractive if, after compensating the 
elderly, the net welfare effect for future generations were still positive. 
Unfortunately, this is not the case: it is well-known that a PAYG pension 
scheme is Pareto efficient. That is, abstracting from distortions by the PAYG 
scheme (other than the crowding out of private savings) it is not possible to 
have one generation gain from decreasing the size of the PAYG scheme 
without harming at least one other generation. This applies to both a small 
open economy (Verbon, 1989) and a closed economy (Breyer, 1989). 
 
5.3 Increasing labour-market participation  
Another policy reaction considered in many countries is focused on 
increasing labour supply: for example, through increasing the effective 
retirement age or the labour supply of women. Evidently, if such a policy is 
effective, it lowers the capital-labour ratio in a closed economy, leading to 
lower wages and a higher interest rate. These effects may be reinforced if 
the degree of utilisation of human capital stimulates investment in 
schooling. The effect of this type of policy on utility is ambiguous. In an 
economy without any distortion of the labour-supply decision, a policy of 
stimulating labour supply would introduce a distortion and thus lower 
welfare. In reality, labour-supply decisions are distorted by many factors 
such as taxes, early retirement schemes, or a fixed retirement age. If the 
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policy is to stimulate labour supply by eliminating or reducing such an 
existing distortion, this may increase welfare. Given that there are typically 
a large number of distortions, this is by no means guaranteed, however: 
second-best theory teaches that distortions may interact and reducing one 
distortion does not necessarily raise welfare. 
 In a small open economy, increasing the labour supply results in an 
inflow of capital instead of a drop in the capital-labour ratio, implying that 
it is more likely to increase welfare than in a closed economy. It should be 
noted that such a policy has a negative international externality 
comparable to that of introducing a PAYG scheme (discussed earlier in 
Section 2.5). Consequently, the welfare effects will be smaller (or even 
negative) if many countries apply the same policy and there may be scope 
for policy coordination. 
 
5.4 Altruism and bequests  
The Diamond-Samuelson model discussed earlier abstracts from 
intergenerational altruism (i.e., individuals have finite horizons and do not 
care about their descendants). Instead, one may assume that people value 
their children’s happiness (see Barro, 1974). That is, one may assume that a 
person derives utility not only from his own lifetime consumption, but also 
from the prospective utility of his children, and that that person uses 
bequests as an instrument to affect the latter.28 It can easily be shown that 
this, in principle, transforms the overlapping-generations model into a 
dynastic model, comparable to the well-known Ramsey model (see Weil 
(1987) and Kimball (1987)). In such a model, decisions are derived from 
maximising a dynastic welfare function including utility of all current and 
future generations. Two types of dynastic welfare functions can be 
distinguished: a Benthamite welfare function and Millian one. The former 
type of welfare function results from the altruistic model if the prospective 
utility of a child is weighted by the number of children. A Millian welfare 
function results if altruism is modeled as parents taking account of the 
utility of a representative child, disregarding the number of children. The 
                                                        
28 Alternatively, one could assume a joy-of-giving model, where parents derive direct 
utility from the size of the bequest they leave (Yaari, 1965). It should be noted that we 
analyse only intended bequests. We excluded unintended bequests by assuming perfect 
annuity markets. For the effect of PAYG pensions on accidental bequests, see Abel (1985). 
Also note that we exclude strategic altruism, i.e., intergenerational transfers as payment 
for services provided by children (Bernheim et al., 1985). 
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effect of changes in fertility crucially depends on which type of welfare 
function is assumed. Canton and Meijdam (1997) show that in a closed 
economy with a Millian welfare function, a decrease in fertility raises the 
capital-labour ratio. That is, with a Millian welfare function there is a 
capital-deepening effect similar to the effect described above in the non-
altruistic case. With a Benthamite welfare function, however, the capital-
labour ratio is not affected by fertility. The intuition for this is that (with a 
Benthamite welfare function) fewer births imply a reduced weight on 
future generations in dynastic preferences. There is no need to endow 
them with more capital than the current cohort. Therefore, bequests 
sharply fall, implying a strong decrease in savings (see Bohn, 2006). 
 There is one caveat in the analysis of altruism and bequests so far: 
bequests cannot be negative, as parents cannot force children to make 
transfers to them. Therefore, the correspondence between altruistic 
overlapping generations and the Ramsey model only holds when altruism 
is strong enough to exclude negative transfers to future generations. 
However, different from private households, governments are able to 
enforce transfers from children to parents. In fact, a PAYG scheme is 
nothing more than a mechanism to enforce such transfers. Government 
debt is yet another mechanism to do so. Government debt or a PAYG 
scheme can therefore be rationalised as the outcome of optimising a 
dynastic social welfare function with a relatively low degree of altruism 
towards future generations. So the results for the altruistic model also 
apply if we assume the existence of a welfare-maximising government 
using intergenerational transfers as an instrument (Meijdam and Verbon, 
1997). In fact, it is not necessary to assume that the government takes the 
utility of all future generations into account and sets intergenerational 
transfers over an infinite horizon. The same outcome is reached if the 
government during each period determines the intergenerational transfer 
so as to maximise a weighted sum of utilities of the generations living in 
that period, taking future transfers as given (Meijdam and Verbon, 1996). 
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6. International spillover effects via capital markets  
 
As discussed in Section 2.1, the return to capital (the interest rate) is 
determined by the size of the capital-labour ratio. If a country is a closed 
economy, then population ageing or changing savings behaviour results in 
changes in this ratio, leading to a different value of the interest rate. 
However, most economies nowadays have open borders, allowing investors 
to include foreign assets in their portfolio, thereby transferring part of their 
(financial) capital to other countries. In the extreme case a country can be 
seen as a small open economy where the capital-labour ratio and the 
interest rate are determined on the world capital market. This section 
considers the intermediate case by assuming that the world consists of two 
countries of the same size that are large enough to affect the capital-
labour ratio. In so doing we take into account not only the effects via 
changing factor prices (as in the closed-economy case), but also the effects 
via capital flows (as in the small-open-economy case). If one country is 
larger than the other, the effects for the larger country will move towards 
the effects in a closed economy, while the effects for the smaller country 
resemble more the effects in a small open economy. This framework allows 
us to analyse how countries affect each other when they differ in their 
ageing pattern, pension systems, policy reactions, and so forth. 
 Capital flows will occur –ceteris paribus– from countries with an initially 
high capital-labour ratio to those with a low capital-labour ratio, until 
interest rates are equal.29 This then automatically implies equal values of 
the capital-labour ratio and wages. Any disturbance that causes 
asymmetric effects on the capital-labour ratio between countries, and 
thereby on the interest rates, triggers international capital flows. These 
capital flows will also affect the well being of people. The utility effects of 
these capital flows are referred to as international spillover effects via 
capital markets. This section analyses these international spillover effects 
of capital flows. We distinguish between international spillovers resulting 
from demographic factors, institutional factors, factors relating to 
individual preferences, and policy reactions. 
 
                                                        
29 The following discussion assumes a situation of perfect international capital mobility. 
See Section 7 for a discussion of imperfect capital mobility. 
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6.1 Capital flows and demographic factors  
Capital flows caused by demographic factors occur if countries experience a 
different timing or extent of population ageing. This can be illustrated with 
an example of two countries, A and B. A country’s capital stock,  K
i  
( i = A,B ), is financed with domestic savings,  Si , and net foreign 
investments,  F
i , so  K
i = Si + F i .30 If  L
i  denotes the total number of 
labour-efficiency units, the capital-labour ratio is given by  K i /Li . 
International capital mobility implies that these ratios are equal:  K A /LA  =  KB /LB  =  k , and that one country’s capital outflow equals the other 
country’s capital inflow (  F A + FB =0 ). 
 Country  i ’s old-age dependency ratio is denoted by  µ
i , and net foreign 
assets per labour-efficiency unit by   f i ≡ F i /Li . For the moment we assume 
that aggregate savings are constant. If the total population size does not 
change (so that ageing is merely an increase in inactive people and a 
decrease in active people), and labour-participation rates do not change 
either, then the change in the capital flow into country  A  can be written 
as  
     df A = LBLA + LB k dµB1+ µB − dµA1+ µA⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ .     (22) 
 From this we can clearly see that if country  A  experiences relatively more 
ageing compared to country  B , then    dµA /(1+ µA )>dµB /(1+ µB )  holds, 
which implies a capital flow from country  A  to country  B  (i.e.,    df A <0 ). 
This will be more pronounced if the initial capital-labour ratio is high and 
if country  A ’s labour force is smaller than that of country  B . The reason is 
that if one country has a more severe ageing of its population than the 
other, its labour force will shrink more. This makes capital relatively more 
abundant ( k
A > kB ), which has a stronger downward effect on the interest 
rate ( r
A < rB ). Consequently, capital will flow from that country to the 
country where ageing is not as strong (   df A <0 ,    df B >0 ) until the interest 
rates, and thereby the capital-labour ratios, are again equal. 
If the two countries were identical in the initial steady state, these capital 
flows imply that country  A  becomes a net lender on the international 
capital market and country  B  a net borrower. Compared to the closed-
economy case, these international capital flows result in a lower capital-
labour ratio for country  A , while the capital-labour ratio is higher in 
                                                        
30 Note that if  F
i  is negative, the country is investing part of its savings abroad. 
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country  B . Now we present a framework to analyse the welfare effects of 
these capital flows. 
 
Long-run utility effects 
As explained in Box 4 in Section 2.2 a rise in the capital-labour ratio will 
have positive utility effects in the long run in a dynamically-efficient 
closed economy. This effect is also present in the open-economy case, 
where we allow for capital flows between countries. There is, however, an 
extra current-account effect, which becomes more evident if we rewrite 
equation (14) to  
    dEUdk = u' c y( ) f " k( )1+ r k g− r( ) + s − k 1+ g( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦    (23) 
The first term between the brackets shows the golden-rule (GR) effect that 
was also present in the closed-economy case. A higher capital-labour ratio 
implies a lower interest rate  r  and less capital underaccumulation; the 
economy will therefore be closer to the golden-rule point where 
consumption per capita is maximised ( r = g ). The second and third terms 
represent the so-called current-account (CA) effect. The direction of this 
effect crucially depends on whether a country is a net borrower or a net 
lender on the international capital market. If a country is a net borrower,   s < k(1+ g)  holds, and this CA effects reinforces the positive GR effect. The 
intuition is that the lower interest rate that results from a higher capital-
labour ratio is advantageous for a country that borrows money. This implies 
that a rise in the capital-labour ratio will unambiguously have positive 
utility effects for a country that is a net borrower. The country that has less 
severe population ageing (country  B ) will therefore experience 
unambiguously positive utility effects in the long run from the capital 
inflow. If a country is a net lender, however,   s > k(1+ g) , and the CA effect 
will dampen the positive GR effect (as the lower interest rate hurts a 
country that is an exporter of financial capital). A higher capital-labour 
ratio will therefore have ambiguous effects on the utility of individuals 
living in a country that is a net lender on the international capital market. 
If an economy finds itself far enough from the golden-rule level of capital 
accumulation, the GR effect will dominate the CA effect. Adema (2008, 
Appendices 2.C.2. and 3.A.2) show that this is the case for realistic 
parameter values. This allows us to conclude that lifetime utility increases 
if the capital-labour ratio increases in a dynamically-efficient open 
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economy. As the outflow of financial capital results in a lower capital-
labour ratio in the country that ages relatively more (country  A ) compared 
to the closed-economy case, this country experiences negative spillover 
effects from the fact that it has one capital market with a country that ages 
less. The country with less severe population ageing (country  B ), on the 
other hand, benefits from the fact that it shares a common capital market 
with country  A . 
 
Data and empirics 
Figure 1 in the Introduction shows the projected development of old-age 
dependency ratios for several European countries. Ageing will be more 
pronounced in southern European countries (like Spain and Italy), and less 
so in France and the Netherlands. This would –ceteris paribus– imply a 
capital flow from the former to the latter countries. 
 Within the OECD (see Figure 2), capital flows based on different 
demographic developments are expected to occur from European countries 
and especially Japan to the United States. At the global level, China will 
experience relatively little ageing until 2025, implying that the current 
large capital outflow from China might be reduced in the coming decades if 
the more-developed regions have higher old-age dependency ratios. In 
the years thereafter, however, the Chinese old-age dependency ratio will 
sharply increase, which will increase the capital outflow again. The less- 
and least-developed countries, on the other hand, face a much smaller 
ageing population and are therefore expected to experience capital 
inflows.31 The above analysis of the international spillovers then shows 
that, based on differential ageing patterns, a country like the Netherlands 
gains from the fact that southern European countries have a more severe 
ageing of their population as this might lead to an inflow of financial 
capital. On the other hand, other regions in the world (like the US and 
developing countries) have populations that age less, and there might be a 
net capital outflow from the Netherlands to these countries, so that 
ultimately, the long-run welfare of the Dutch is affected negatively. 
 Several empirical studies confirm that demographic factors matter for 
international capital flows. Drawing on time-series and cross-section data 
                                                        
31 Note that this is solely based on comparative demographic developments. Naturally, 
other factors (such as technological progress, education, and political developments) play 
an important role too. 
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for 100 countries, Higgins (1998) shows that for the period 1950-1990, 
differences in the timing of demographic change across countries and 
regions affect international capital flows. Countries with a higher old-age 
dependency ratio have higher savings compared to domestic investments, 
and are therefore capital exporters. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) find 
that long-term capital movements are explained by a small set of 
fundamentals, among them demographic factors: a country’s net foreign 
asset position, caused by a capital outflow to other countries, is positively 
influenced by a higher share of workers close to retirement. However, this 
does not hold for the people older than 65. Lührmann (2003) even 
demonstrates that demographics is the most important determinant of 
cross-border capital movements. Domeij and Flodén (2006) use a standard 
neoclassical growth model with demographics that is consistent with the 
life-cycle hypothesis, and find that the data generated by the model can 
explain a small but significant fraction of real-world capital flows between 
18 OECD countries from 1960 to 2002, particularly after 1985 (which is 
consistent with increasing international capital mobility in the last 
decades). 
 
6.2 Capital flows and institutional factors  
Apart from demographic factors, institutional factors also determine the 
size and direction of capital flows. The institutional factors consist of 
different types of pension schemes, fiscal treatment of retirement savings, 
and early retirement arrangements. 
 
Funded versus PAYG pensions 
The first institutional factor involves the degree of funding in pension 
schemes, which affects savings and thereby the supply of capital. As was 
shown in Equation (19), an unfunded or PAYG scheme has a negative effect 
on savings. So if one country (say country  A ) mainly finances its pensions 
with a PAYG scheme, savings will be relatively low, implying a low capital-
labour ratio and high interest rate if it were a closed economy. But if the 
country has an integrated capital market with another country ( B ), which 
has a larger degree of pension funding (through e.g., pension funds or 
private savings accounts), then an international capital flow will occur from 
the country with a funded scheme to the country with an unfunded 
scheme. The size of this capital flow into country  A  is given by  
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 f A = LBLA + LB sB − s A( ) ,     (24) 
 which obviously is positive if per capita savings in country  B  are higher 
than in country  A , due to the presence of a more generous PAYG scheme 
in the latter country. The capital flow from country  B  to country  A  will 
affect people in the latter country positively, while long-run welfare will 
fall in the country with relatively more funding, under realistic parameter 
values. 
 
Table 1 shows the relative size of the three pension-scheme components in 
several European countries, and Table 2 shows the amount of pension 
funds’ assets. In Spain, France, Italy and Germany, the first pillar (which 
consists of PAYG-financed retirement income) is the most important part. 
In other countries, such as the Netherlands, Sweden, and Anglo-Saxon 
countries like the United States and the UK, the funded part is more 
substantial. 
 
The degree of funding is also important for the effects of population ageing 
on the capital-labour ratio. Countries with a (largely) funded pension 
scheme would experience a larger increase in their capital-labour ratio if 
they were closed economies, due to the fact that their savings and capital 
stock are high, compared to countries with extensive PAYG schemes. With 
open borders, ageing in both countries will therefore imply an additional 
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capital flow from the country with a mostly funded scheme (like the 
Netherlands, Australia and the United States) to the country with a 
basically unfunded scheme (like France, Italy and Germany). Put 
differently, the capital-deepening effect is smoothed over both countries. 
 These capital flows result in long-run positive spillover effects for the 
PAYG country, which benefits both from the higher capital stock and the 
resulting lower interest rate on its borrowings from abroad. The funded 
country, on the other hand, is negatively affected by the lower capital 
stock, but gains from the resulting higher interest rate (as it is a lender on 
the international capital market). For realistic parameter values, the first 
effect dominates and therefore a country with funded pensions is in the 
long run adversely affected by the existence of a PAYG scheme in the other 
country if the population is ageing. As most EMU countries mainly use PAYG 
pension schemes, a country like the Netherlands (relying to a relatively 
large extent on funded pensions) can be considered as relatively small. If 
the funded country is smaller than the PAYG country, the negative spillover 
effects for the funded country become larger (as the capital outflow will be 
larger). 
 
Fiscal treatment of retirement savings 
As was discussed in Section 2.5, the special fiscal treatment of pension 
savings through an EET regime can affect the savings decision of 
households, and thereby aggregate private savings in a country. Apart from 
this, the fiscal treatment of pension savings also influences the effect of 
demographic developments on national savings. With an EET regime, 
retirement savings (such as contributions to a pension fund) are tax 
deductible, while the pension benefits are taxed when paid out to retirees. 
For the government, this implies lower tax revenues when a vast part of 
the population is of working age, leading –ceteris paribus– to a higher 
government deficit and lower national savings. If people anticipate future 
ageing by saving more, these higher private savings are partly offset by the 
higher government deficit. On the other hand, when the ageing process 
actually occurs, relatively many people receive pension benefits and pay 
income taxes. The reduction in private savings is then partly offset by a 
lower public deficit compared to the situation without an EET regime. 
Hence, such a fiscal treatment dampens the effect of population ageing on 
national savings. Consequently, it will also affect the timing, size and 
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possibly the direction of international capital flows, especially if the 
countries involved have different fiscal treatments. 
 
Defined benefits versus defined contributions 
Another factor that matters for the effects of ageing on the capital-labour 
ratio is the degree to which either contributions or pension benefits adjust 
to shocks; that is, whether the system is characterised by defined benefits 
or defined contributions.32 In case of a PAYG scheme with defined benefits, 
ageing implies that contributions made by younger generations will have 
to increase to pay for the pension promises made to the retired.33 
Consequently, savings will decrease, and more capital will flow from the 
funded to the unfunded country, reinforcing the negative spillover effect of 
the unfunded system for the funded country. However, if the PAYG scheme 
is characterised by fixed contributions, then ageing means lower pension 
benefits and forward-looking individuals will respond to this by increasing 
their savings. The difference with the country with a funded scheme will 
become smaller, and less capital will flow into the country with an 
unfunded scheme. The international spillovers will therefore also be 
smaller for both countries. 
 Something similar holds for a funded scheme. Although such a scheme is 
not directly affected by population ageing, it can experience considerable 
indirect effects through downward pressure on the interest rate caused by 
ageing. Here, too, a distinction can be made between defined 
contributions and defined benefits. With defined benefits, a lower return 
to capital must be compensated by higher contributions of the young. In 
that case, a PAYG element enters the funded scheme, which acts like an 
insurance, and savings will consequently decrease. The increasing effect on 
the capital-labour ratio will then be dampened, as will changes in 
international capital flows, if all funded countries run such a scheme. On 
the other hand, a lower interest rate will decrease pension benefits in case 
of a defined-contribution scheme. Forward-looking individuals will 
respond to this by increasing their private savings (if the income effect 
dominates the substitution effect). In the latter case, the capital-
                                                        
32 Also referred to as intergenerational risk-sharing factors. 
33 This also applies to full indexation of pension benefits. 
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deepening effect and international capital flows (and thus the 
international spillovers) are reinforced.34 
 
Early retirement 
The last institutional factor concerns early retirement programs, which 
affect labour supply. If countries have different early retirement schemes, 
this will –ceteris paribus– lead to differences in labour supply.35 With 
generous programs providing incentives to retire early, labour supply will 
be lower compared to other countries, which has an upward effect on the 
capital-labour ratio. This leads to a capital flow to other countries with less 
generous early-retirement programs. This can also be seen from equation 
(24). If both countries have the same aggregate savings, but people in 
country  A  retire earlier than in people in  B ,  L
A  will be lower than  L
B  
and consequently  s
A > sB . This will lead to capital flows out of country  A  
(   f A <0 ).36 This capital outflow will affect people living in the country with 
the more generous early-retirement scheme negatively in the long run. 
 
6.3 Capital flows and preferential factors  
Preferential factors can also play a role. If citizens of one country have a 
higher rate of time preference than citizens of another country, savings will 
be higher in the latter (see also equation (19)). As with a difference in the 
degree of pension funding, this leads to a capital flow to the country with 
a high rate of time preference (see e.g., Buiter (1981)). It has always been 
held that people in Japan have a relatively low rate of time preference, as 
saving rates were very high in the past, reaching a peak of 24 percent of 
disposable household income in the 1970s. During the last decade, 
however, saving rates in Japan declined dramatically from 11.8% in 1998 to 
3.1% in 2008 (OECD, 2008), indicating that time-preference rates went up. 
In the US saving rates are even smaller: 0.6 percent in 2008, implying that 
                                                        
34 As was shown in Box 2 in Section 2.2, with a Cobb-Douglas utility function both effects 
cancel out, and a change in the interest rate has no effect on savings. 
35 This actually holds more generally for differences in labour efficiency and differences in 
all sorts of labour-market institutions. 
36 Of course, also here the degree of funding is important: if people finance their early 
retirement by saving more,  S
A  will be higher than  S
B , implying an even bigger capital 
outflow from country  A . However, if early retirement is financed on a PAYG basis, this 
negatively affects savings in country  A . If this latter effect dominates, the opposite 
happens: capital will flow into country  A . 
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individuals in the US have a high rate of time preference. In Europe, on the 
other hand, saving rates are still relatively high (9.3% in the Euro area) and 
therefore people in Europe are relatively patient and have a low rate of 
time preference. The framework in Section 6.1 then shows that the US gains 
from the capital inflow, while EMU countries lose (as capital flows out of 
these countries towards the US, resulting in a lower capital-labour ratio). 
 
6.4 Capital flows and policy reactions  
Countries that are confronted with an ageing population can take several 
policy measures. Subsequently, this can affect international capital flows. 
Here we discuss the most important policy reactions: a shift to a more-
funded pension scheme, an increase in the retirement age, and a higher 
government debt, which might be accompanied with higher inflation 
(risk). 
 
Pension reform 
Population ageing puts pressure on pension schemes financed on a PAYG 
basis, as the rise in the old-age dependency ratio implies that either 
contributions to the scheme have to rise to high levels or pension benefits 
have to fall to a large extent. One of the most-discussed proposals to 
increase the sustainability of the pension system is to reform the PAYG 
scheme and switch to a more-funded scheme. An example of such a 
reform can be found in the so-called Riester reforms in Germany that took 
place in 2001. Pension reforms that involve a transition from PAYG 
financing to a more-funded scheme will affect national savings, and 
thereby international capital flows. Let τ  be the PAYG contribution rate. As 
was shown in Equation (19) in Box 5, savings are negatively affected by a 
PAYG scheme, so  s = s(τ )  with    ′s ≡ ∂s / ∂τ <0 . Ignoring the direct effects of 
ageing on capital flows, changes in the size of the PAYG scheme ( dτ ) in 
countries  A  and  B  will affect the capital flow to country  A  as follows:
37  
     df A = LBLA + LB ′s dτ B −dτ A( ).    (25) 
 If, for example, country  A  reforms its pension scheme to a more-funded 
scheme (   dτ A <0 ), and the other country does not, there will be a capital 
flow from country  A  to country  B  (   df A <0 ). If country  A  is small relative 
                                                        
37 In deriving this expression, we assumed that savings responses to changes in the PAYG 
contribution rate are the same in the two countries; that is,  s
A′ = sB ′ = ′s . 
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to country  B , then a larger share of its additional savings will flow to 
country  B . This switch to funding increases the capital-labour ratio in 
both countries and will increase welfare in the long run in a dynamically-
efficient economy. However, as part of the extra savings is invested in the 
non-reforming country  B , the long-run welfare gains for the reforming 
country  A  are smaller compared to the welfare gains in a closed economy. 
If the other country implements a similar reform, however,    df A =0 , and 
the effect on the aggregate capital flow ( F
A ) depends on the relative size 
of the country. 
 
Increase labour-force participation 
Another policy option is to increase the retirement age or to stimulate 
labour-force participation of the young generation. If effective, this will 
lead to an increase in the labour force and will thus partially offset the 
effects of ageing. In terms of the previous analysis (see equation (22)), later 
retirement implies that the old-age dependency ratio increases to a 
smaller extent, so  dµ  takes a smaller value. If this occurs more in country 
 A  than it does in country  B , then equation (22) shows that capital will 
flow into country  A  (   df A >0 ) to ensure equality of capital-labour ratios 
between the countries. Many European countries decided to gradually 
increase the official retirement age. However, this is a sensitive issue. Our 
analysis shows that if one country decides not to increase the official 
retirement age, while other countries succeed in increasing labour-force 
participation, part of the (pension) savings will be invested in these other 
countries. This capital outflow, in turn, will –ceteris paribus– affect welfare 
negatively in the long run. 
 
Government debt 
In the coming decades, population ageing will put great pressure on public 
finances in the EMU. This is especially true for countries that have large 
public pension schemes financed on the basis of PAYG, where the working 
population pays taxes to finance the pension benefits of the elderly. In 
these countries the projected increases in government expenditures are 
enormous (see European Commission, 2006) and the temptation for 
governments to use debt instead of raising taxes or lowering pension 
benefits will be large. 
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Denoting public debt per capita by  d
i  for country  i , equation (24) changes 
to  
     f A = LBLA + LB sB − dB( )− s A − dA( )⎡⎣⎢ ⎤⎦⎥ .    (26) 
As can be seen from this equation, the effect of a higher public debt on 
capital flows depends crucially on the extent to which private savings ( s ) 
react. If, for instance, public debt increases in country  A , without an 
equally large increase in private savings in that country, this will lead to a 
crowding-out of the capital stock (see also Section 5.1) and to a capital 
inflow from the country that does not use debt (or does to a lesser 
degree).38 Consequently, as was analysed by Persson (1985), this leads to 
redistribution of intergenerational welfare in different countries. For both 
countries it holds that the initial welfare effects are favourable, but future 
generations will be adversely affected due to the lower capital-labour 
ratio. Future generations in country  A  are to some extent protected by the 
fact that they have a common capital market with country  B  (as part of 
their public debt will be financed with savings of the latter country). Part 
of the debt burden is thus transmitted to the country that does not 
increase its public debt via the capital market. Put differently, debt in 
country  A  causes negative long-run spillovers for country  B . 
 
Inflation 
Another way that government debt might affect other members of a 
monetary union is that high levels of debt may lead to higher levels of 
inflation or a higher risk of inflation. High levels of nominal government 
debt may give governments an incentive to put pressure on the central 
bank to create surprise inflation, as this will reduce the fiscal burden of 
debt service. In a closed-economy setting, unexpected inflation is a zero-
sum game. On the one hand, the government gains from unexpected 
inflation (as it decreases the real value of government debt and the real 
return on government bonds). On the other hand, the people (or pension 
                                                        
38 If, on the other hand, Ricardian equivalence holds, and savings increase by the same 
amount as the rise in public debt, there will be no effect on international capital flows. 
Furthermore, if a switch to a more-funded scheme is accompanied by an equally large 
increase in public debt (e.g., in order to avoid a double burden for any generation alive 
during the transition), them the rise in  S
i  is offset by the rise in  D
i , and there will be no 
effect on international capital flows. See Sections 5.1 and 5.2 for more details. 
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funds39) that invested in government bonds lose from the unexpected fall 
of the real return on government bonds. In a closed economy, the gain for 
the government is exactly high enough to compensate the agents that lose 
from the unexpected inflation shock. 
 In a two-country world in which one country relies on PAYG pensions 
and the other has a fully-funded pension scheme, however, the PAYG 
country gains from unexpected inflation at the cost of the funded country. 
This means that there may be a conflict of interest on monetary policy 
when countries with different pension schemes form a monetary union. 
The reason for this result is that residents of the funded country hold a 
relatively large share of the total amount of government bonds because 
they save more than people in the PAYG country. This implies that the PAYG 
country can export part of the inflationary tax on debt holders to the 
funded country, while it still receives the full gain of a lower debt burden, 
and a net gain results. So when a PAYG country forms a monetary union 
with a funded country, it has an incentive to put pressure on the central 
bank to increase inflation unexpectedly. This gain of unexpected inflation 
for a PAYG country rises with the amount of nominal government debt. This 
implies that when PAYG countries finance their increased pension 
obligations that result from the ageing of the population by issuing more 
debt, the incentive (of PAYG governments) to lobby for surprise inflation 
will rise. On the other hand, unexpected inflation will harm funded 
countries more if PAYG countries issue large amounts of nominal 
government debt. The conflicts of interest on monetary policy between 
PAYG and funded countries may therefore be reinforced if population 
ageing raises government debt in PAYG countries. 
 If the decision-making process of the central bank is not completely 
transparent to market participants, it is not clear how the central bank will 
react to these conflicting interests. As a consequence, there will be more 
uncertainty about what the final outcome for inflation will be, and 
inflation risk may rise with the level of government debt in PAYG countries. 
Higher inflation risk makes government bonds less attractive to hold, and 
                                                        
39 Pension funds lose from unexpected inflation only if they guarantee the pension 
benefits of their participants in real terms (i.e., if they index the benefits). If pension 
benefits are guaranteed only in nominal terms, pension funds do not have to worry about 
surprise inflation. The retirees will then bear the full burden of the unexpected inflation 
shock. 
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the return the government has to pay on bonds will rise.40 In a monetary 
union, inflation risk is a common risk factor for all members. This implies 
that not only the countries that increase their debt have to pay a higher 
risk premium on their government bonds, but also governments that do 
not increase their debt will face higher interest obligations. Therefore, both 
countries experience negative welfare effects from the rise in inflation 
risk.41 
 In the coming decades it will therefore be important for funded countries 
that the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact are met, so that debt levels 
of PAYG countries do not rise to overly high levels. The use of government 
debt by PAYG countries to cope with the costs of ageing benefits the initial 
generations in these countries, as they suffer most from ageing. Future 
generations, however, are harmed by the larger debt burden. In a 
monetary union, part of this burden can be shifted to the funded country, 
and the debt burden can be reduced by an unexpected rise in inflation 
when the PAYG country successfully lobbies at the central bank. If this 
lobbying only raises perceived inflation risk, however, then the negative 
effects of a rise in the riskiness of government bonds in response to a 
higher level of public debt cannot be shared with the funded country. It 
may therefore also be in the interest of PAYG countries to obey the fiscal 
constraints stated in the Stability and Growth Pact in order to prevent large 
increases in government debt, which may raise inflation risk. Moreover, it 
is important for all countries that a central bank like the ECB is 
independent, credible and transparent, so that it is clear how monetary 
policy is determined and so that the risk of inflation does not rise when 
debt levels are high. 
 Another implication of the analysis above is that market participants 
(perceiving that the risk of inflation is too high) might (in the coming 
decades) put more pressure on governments to issue indexed bonds. This 
implies that if future governments want to use debt in order to collect the 
necessary funds to finance their expenditures, then the market will be 
                                                        
40 This is only the case when investors are interested in the real return on their 
investments. 
41 If a larger amount of government debt only increases default risk, then countries with 
different debt levels would face different risk premiums. In that case, agents that invest in 
government bonds will be compensated for the higher risk in the form of a higher return, 
and the country that does not increase its debt does not have to pay a higher interest rate 
on its debt. 
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willing to finance this debt only if the return on government bonds is 
guaranteed in real terms. As inflation risk is a common risk factor for all 
member states of the EMU, this also means that countries that do not 
increase their debt levels are still forced to issue indexed bonds. 
 
6.5 Key results and policy implications 
This section analysed how countries affect each other if they have different 
ageing patterns and different retirement institutions. These differences will 
lead to capital flows between countries thereby inducing international 
spillover effects. Policy reactions in response to ageing will also affect 
capital flows and consequently the well being of people in other countries. 
In general, we therefore conclude that governments should not only 
consider the domestic situation and developments when deciding on the 
policy measures in response to ageing, but also take into account the fact 
that other countries also have ageing populations and that this will affect 
their people as well. Summarising, we can say that a country is more likely 
to experience a capital outflow to other countries and negative spillover 
effects if: 
• its population is ageing more (compared to other countries),  
• it runs a relatively extensive funded-pension scheme,  
• it switches to a more-funded scheme (or pursues this course to a greater 
extent than other countries do),  
• its pension plans are mainly defined-contribution,  
• its citizens have a relatively low rate of time preference,  
• it has a more generous early-retirement scheme,  
• it increases the retirement age less than other countries do,  
• it increases government debt in response to ageing relatively less than 
other countries do.  
Our analysis shows, for example, that in a country like the Netherlands 
(where policy makers are currently discussing whether the official 
retirement age should be increased or not), one should also consider what 
the neighbouring countries do (i.e., in countries where part of the Dutch 
financial capital is invested). If other countries increase their retirement 
age, this will negatively affect countries that do not increase their 
retirement age, as part of their savings will be invested in countries where 
capital is relatively scarcer. So if other European countries increase their 
retirement age, it might be better for the Netherlands to increase the 
retirement age as well. 
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 This section also showed that countries in the European Union with 
funded pension schemes, such as the Netherlands, would in the long term 
bear part of the burden of an ageing population in countries operating a 
PAYG system. The funded countries will eventually share in the costs of 
ageing in the PAYG countries, particularly if these countries are using 
government debt to finance the long-term costs of ageing.42 If government 
debt is very high, then governments of PAYG countries have an incentive to 
put pressure on the central bank to create surprise inflation (as part of the 
inflation tax will be borne by investors in the funded countries). And when 
it is not clear to market participants how the central bank will react to 
these conflicting interests, the market might perceive that the risk of 
inflation is higher and ask a higher risk premium on government bonds in 
general. This has direct negative implications for all countries in the 
monetary union. It is therefore vital that all countries in the EMU comply 
with the Stability and Growth Pact. It is also important that the European 
Central Bank is independent, credible and transparent. 
 Another implication of a higher risk of inflation is that it might be 
advisable that pension funds reallocate their investment portfolio more 
towards real assets, and invest less in nominal bonds, when they index the 
pension benefits of their participants. Furthermore, market participants 
might force governments to issue indexed bonds so that the return on 
government bonds is guaranteed in real terms instead of in nominal terms. 
In that way, governments of PAYG countries with high debt levels no longer 
have any incentive to lobby for surprise inflation, which dampens the risk 
of a higher inflation. 
                                                        
42 High debt levels could also result from the current deficits that accumulate during the 
economic crisis. 
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7. How mobile is capital internationally?  
 
In the previous sections, it was assumed that capital moves freely between 
countries as long as there is an interest rate difference. This is an important 
assumption because if it holds, ageing countries can invest their excess 
savings abroad, in countries with younger populations, so that the 
marginal product of capital (the interest rate) would not decrease much. It 
is, however, questionable whether capital is indeed perfectly mobile 
internationally. At the other extreme, with completely immobile capital, 
the setting of a closed economy applies and a sharp increase in the 
capital-labour ratio is to be expected, especially if labour participation 
does not increase. This section discusses results from studies on 
international capital mobility. 
 
7.1 Empirical observations  
There are several ways to investigate the degree of international capital 
mobility. One way is to look at the correlation between domestic savings 
and investments. If capital were perfectly mobile, there would hardly be 
any correlation. In a seminal paper, Feldstein and Horioka (1980) found 
that for the period 1960-1974, these two are strongly correlated, indicating 
that capital is quite immobile.43 Naturally, financial markets have become 
more integrated over the last decades, and international capital flows have 
become more important. A more recent study by Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(2000), which conducted the same research as Feldstein and Horioka, 
found that for the period 1990-1997, the correlation decreased (but 
remains significant), so capital has indeed become more mobile.44 
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) note that the saving-investment correlations 
have decreased in Europe, especially in the Euro area. Therefore, according 
to this measure, one may conclude that capital is becoming more mobile, 
although this seems to be restricted to industrialised countries. Taylor 
(2002) reaches a similar conclusion by analysing time-series of current 
accounts for 15 countries since 1850. 
                                                        
43 Corbin (2001) doubts whether such correlations stem from capital immobility. She finds 
that specific individual country effects account for these correlations. 
44 In Feldstein and Horioka (1980), a regression coefficient of 0.91 between the domestic 
savings and investments ratios is found; Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) find a value of 0.64. 
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 Another approach involves investigating consumption-risk sharing. If the 
correlation of GDP between different countries is smaller than the 
correlation of per capita consumption, this points to international risk 
sharing, which is only possible if capital is mobile between countries. Artis 
and Hoffmann (2007) find that international risk sharing increased in the 
1990s. In Europe, one-third of the macroeconomic risk sharing achieved 
through international financial markets was realised through capital-
income flows. This might have been caused by the elimination of 
exchange-rate risk among EMU countries. Outside Europe, however, this is 
not the case. This is in line with the results found by Blanchard and 
Giavazzi (2002). 
 Finally, one can look directly at the extent to which portfolios of 
domestic investors consist of external assets. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2005) find that especially among industrial countries, the distribution of 
net external positions has widened, and portfolios are less specialised in 
domestic securities. Looking more specifically at pension funds (as an 
example), we see that most bonds and stocks owned by the largest Dutch 
pension fund (ABP) were foreign (see Table 3). Most bonds are European or 
from North America, while stocks are more evenly spread from all over the 
world. 
 
7.2 Causes of international capital immobility  
The previous section showed that according to several measures, capital is 
not completely mobile internationally, especially to countries outside the 
OECD area. Several causes of capital immobility have been described in the 
literature and will be briefly touched upon here. 
 Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) give the following potential explanations 
of capital immobility. First of all, governments can impose capital controls. 
This will directly restrict the opportunities of investors to move capital to 
places with the highest rate of return. Secondly, purchasing foreign 
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securities involves high transactions costs. In that case, some difference 
between interest rates can persist.45 However, especially in developed 
countries these costs are not very large. Thirdly, investing abroad often 
implies exchange-rate or currency risk. This risk has disappeared for 
countries within the EMU. Furthermore, financial markets allow investors to 
hedge against this risk for an increasing number of foreign currencies. The 
fourth explanation for capital immobility (and according to Gordon and 
Bovenberg (1996) the most plausible nowadays) is asymmetric information: 
investors lack the knowledge to make a good prediction about future 
returns to investments in a foreign country. The more distant the country is 
(not only geographically but also culturally), the less information and the 
more uncertainty. In this respect, political risks play an important role too. 
Portes and Rey (2005) develop a gravity model and conclude that distance 
is indeed an important factor explaining observed international transaction 
flows. Consequently, all this leads to a ‘home bias’. It is uncertain how this 
will develop in an ageing society. On the one hand, as pension funds 
mature and start paying out pension benefits, their time horizon becomes 
shorter, leaving them less time to make up for lower-than-expected 
returns to investments. In a sense, this makes them more risk averse, 
which would strengthen the home bias. This would correspond to the view 
that the older a person gets, the more risk averse (s)he becomes (see 
Section 4.3). This relates to the recent discussion (in e.g. the Netherlands) 
that pension funds, after the harmful consequences of the financial crisis, 
should invest more in domestic assets and less in foreign assets. Following 
such a strategy would make the scenario of a closed economy more 
realistic. On the other hand, as Attanasio et al. (2007) state, "important 
steps have been taken in the past few years with respect to ‘financial 
engineering’ of emerging markets, so one may expect capital to flow freely 
and more safely in the years to come." Furthermore, they predict that there 
will be a reversal of capital flows from developing to developed countries 
(see also Section 8.3). Since the latter tend to be more politically stable and 
have more developed financial institutions, this will reduce political and 
other risks, and thereby increase the degree of international capital 
mobility. 
 
                                                        
45 In economic models this is often modeled as a capital-adjustment cost. 
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Conclusion 
Capital has become more mobile over the last decades, especially between 
developed countries, but the assumption of perfect capital mobility seems 
too strong for the world as a whole. The most likely scenario will therefore 
be between that of a closed economy and open economies with perfect 
capital mobility. This mitigates the size of the international spillover effects 
discussed in the previous section. Within the EMU, however, perfect capital 
mobility is a reasonable assumption. Among the countries in this region, 
the differences in ageing patterns are not very large, but institutions do 
vary a lot. International spillover effects will therefore mainly stem from 
institutional differences. 
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8. Ageing and the return to capital: quantitative results  
 
The paper thus far has discussed the qualitative effects of ageing on the 
international capital market. This section focuses on the expected 
magnitude of these effects. 
 
8.1 Asset market meltdown?  
In a small open economy, savings can be invested abroad and the interest 
rate is hardly affected, unless other countries experience the same 
demographic developments, at which point the scenario of a closed 
economy is more applicable, and ageing will put downward pressure on 
the interest rate (especially if it is accompanied by an increasing supply of 
capital due to a move to more-funded pensions). This might even lead to a 
situation of dynamic inefficiency and a so-called ‘asset market meltdown’. 
The likelihood of such a scenario is a controversial issue among economists. 
In recent years, many papers have presented a quantification of these 
effects. Abel (2001, 2003), for instance, apply a general-equilibrium model 
and conclude that ageing indeed will cause a sharp decline in asset prices, 
even if a bequest motive is included that causes individuals not to sell all 
of their assets by the end of their life. A similar result is found by Brooks 
(2002), who uses a 4-OLG model of a closed economy in which young 
people invest in risky capital (stocks) and old workers invest most of their 
savings in safe bonds. Because ageing causes the capital-labour ratio to 
increase, the returns on stocks and bonds in 2020 will be 92 and 82 basis 
points below their levels in 2000. After 2020, there will be a gradual return 
to the steady state. As discussed in Section 4.3, Geanakoplos et al. (2004) 
find mixed results, but on the whole they tend to conclude that there is a 
significant relationship between demographic developments and the 
capital market. 
 Others, such as Poterba (2001, 2004), doubt whether demographic 
developments will have sizeable effects on the capital market. Based on 
historical observations that are used to generate a projected asset demand 
and return for the coming decades, their study concludes that the actual 
effect of ageing on the returns to capital (if any) will be very modest 
(although it should be noted that historical data have thus far shown little 
variation in demographic structure, which makes the predictive power of 
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such regression results quite limited).46 Subsequent studies therefore have 
developed computational general-equilibrium models in order to quantify 
the above-mentioned effects. These simulation studies typically use 
detailed projections of demographic developments and different 
institutional features in a multi-country model with multiple overlapping-
generations of the type introduced by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). These 
projections, which compare scenarios of a closed economy with those of 
open economies and perfect capital mobility, can be used to show the 
impact on the interest rate and the size of the international spillover 
effects caused by (differences in) ageing, pension schemes, reforms and so 
forth. The rest of this section will summarise the main results of the most 
recent studies in this field. 
 
8.2 Ageing, pension reform and international capital flows  
The INGENUE (2001) paper was one of the first to build an applied general-
equilibrium model to analyse the international effects of ageing. The 
model has 15 overlapping generations and distinguishes between six 
regions whose demographic developments differ.47 Labour supply is 
exogenous, and PAYG pensions are of the defined-benefit type, so that 
contribution rates adjust to e.g., demographic developments. The 
productivity of developing countries is assumed to converge very slowly 
and incompletely to the level of the developed countries. The interest rate 
is projected to decrease from 4.2% in 2000 to 3.6% in 2035 and afterwards. 
Different pension reforms in European countries have additional effects on 
the interest rate. If PAYG contribution rates are kept constant, the pension 
replacement rate will be 50% lower by 2050, and savings will be higher. 
This partial shift to a more-funded pension scheme causes an additional 
drop of the interest rate of 15 basis points. If, however, the retirement age 
is gradually postponed by five years, the interest rate will fall by 15 basis 
points less due to the higher labour supply until 2020, but afterwards it will 
gradually return to the baseline level. Finally, this model can be used to 
quantify the international spillover effects by comparing the outcomes with 
                                                        
46 Geanakoplos et al. (2004) also note that if globalisation implies a gradual decrease in 
the home bias on financial markets, this will weaken the relation between national 
demographic developments and national financial markets. 
47 These six regions are US/Canada/Australia/New Zealand, the EU, Japan, emerging or 
transition countries with an already ageing population (e.g. Russia and China), emerging 
and developing countries like India, and developing (mostly African) countries. 
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the case of Europe as a closed region. In the latter case, interest-rate 
fluctuations are much more pronounced. For instance, with constant 
contribution rates, the drop in the interest rate will be up to nearly 100 
basis points more in case of a closed economy, implying a total decrease of 
about 150 basis points by 2050. But in case of a constant (gross) 
replacement rate, the change in the interest rate will be close to zero. 
Furthermore, economic growth rates in the closed-economy model are 
lower for all scenarios and fluctuate more (although the time profile is 
roughly the same). 
 A similar model is developed by Börsch-Supan et al. (2006), but with 85 
overlapping generations and four regions consisting of 
France/Italy/Germany, the rest of the European Union, the rest of the OECD, 
and the rest of the world. Furthermore, labour supply is endogenous. Two 
scenarios are considered: one in which the pension replacement rates are 
maintained in the continental European countries (which boils down to a 
defined-benefit system), and another in which contribution rates are fixed 
at their level of 2006 (implying lower PAYG benefits due to ageing and a 
partial transition to a more-funded pension scheme). 
 Rapidly ageing countries such as Germany and Italy will initially 
experience a current-account surplus (and thus a capital outflow and an 
accumulation of foreign assets), but at some point they will become net 
importers. The more countries there are to invest capital in, the later the 
moment at which such a rapidly ageing country starts running current-
account deficits and becomes a rentier economy. As such countries also run 
down their foreign assets, the period of being a rentier economy is limited 
(about 40 years), after which the current account will be balanced. The rate 
of return to capital will decrease by about 100 basis points (from 7% to 
6%), which cannot be qualified as an ‘asset meltdown’. Furthermore, the 
difference between a closed economy and a global economy with perfect 
capital mobility is small, so the variety of demographic developments 
across countries is not substantial enough to have a big impact on the 
interest rate. Finally, a pension reform towards more-funded pensions in 
only Germany, Italy and France decreases the interest rate further by 25 
basis points. On the one hand, savings will increase (and thereby the 
capital-labour ratio); on the other hand, their model includes endogenous 
labour supply: more funding stimulates labour supply because in the 
reform scenario, PAYG contributions are kept constant, so benefits will 
decrease, to which individuals respond by increasing both savings and 
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labour supply. This effect decreases the capital-labour ratio and thus has a 
positive effect on the interest rate. The assumption of endogenous labour 
supply is quite important: if it were exogenous, the only way that people 
can react to lower future PAYG benefits is by saving more, so the move to a 
more-funded scheme goes along with a larger increase of savings, without 
a higher labour supply. This results in a much more pronounced rise of the 
capital-labour ratio and a larger decrease of the rate of return to capital, 
especially in case of a closed economy (i.e., no international capital 
mobility). 
 As for the welfare effects of pension reform, the greater the number of 
foreign countries to invest in, the smaller the number of cohorts that 
experience a welfare loss. However, these differences between the various 
capital mobility scenarios are small. Roughly speaking, individuals born 
after 1982 benefit from having fixed contributions instead of fixed 
replacement rates. 
 Krueger and Ludwig (2007) develop a 75-OLG model with only OECD 
countries, divided in three regions: the US, EU, and the rest of the OECD 
countries. Specific for this model is that it includes idiosyncratic uncertainty 
about labour productivity and mortality. This implies that the income of 
some persons ends up being mainly capital income, while that of others is 
mainly labour income. Furthermore, it also implies that people have a 
precautionary motive to save. According to the simulation results for the 
case of fixed PAYG contribution rates, the world interest rate is predicted to 
gradually fall by approximately 100 basis points (from 7.5% to 6.5%) until 
the year 2050. Capital will flow from the EU and the rest of the OECD to the 
United States in the next 30 years. This is due to the fact that the US is 
ageing relatively less and because the savings rate sharply decreases as a 
result of the retirement of the baby boom generation, which, in the US, is 
relatively largely financed by funded pensions. If the United States and the 
rest of the OECD were closed economies, the US interest rate would decrease 
by 10 basis points less, and the interest rate of the other countries would 
decrease by another 20 basis points. 
 The effects depend a lot on the design of the PAYG pension scheme. If 
the pension replacement rate is kept constant, contribution rates will 
increase by more than 7 percentage points in the next decades. 
Consequently, the decline of the world interest rate is much less 
pronounced: only 20 basis points. Finally, if instead of higher PAYG taxes or 
lower benefits, the retirement age is increased by five years, the drop in 
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the interest rate is the same as before (almost 100 basis points). The latter 
alternative leads to lower welfare losses and for some groups even welfare 
gains from ageing. 
 
Conclusion 
Recent simulation studies show that the interest rate is expected to drop by 
about 0.5-1 percentage points in the long run due to ageing. If many 
countries reform their schemes to a more-funded pension system, instead 
of increasing contribution rates, then the drop in the interest rate will be 
somewhat more pronounced. A larger drop is also expected if labour supply 
does not increase (e.g., if the retirement age is not increased). 
 
8.3 Developing countries: reversal of capital flows?  
Attanasio et al. (2007) explicitly focus on developing countries in their 
analysis by considering two regions: northern (developed) countries and 
southern (developing) countries. These regions differ in several respects: 
developing countries are not ageing as strongly and quickly, they do not 
have extensive PAYG pension schemes, and their productivity levels are 
lower. The assumption is that the demographic structure and productivity 
levels converge to those of the developed countries and will be equal by 
2200. Within the regions, they assume completely homogeneous countries. 
There are 24 overlapping generations. 
 The simulation results show that if the developed countries as a whole 
are a closed economy, then the interest rate gradually decreases by 180 
basis points (from 6.6% to 4.8%) until 2040, after which it stabilises.48 The 
effect of a smaller work-force dominates the effect of lower savings, so the 
capital-labour ratio rises. However, somewhat surprisingly, if capital is 
mobile to the southern developing countries, the interest rate is expected 
to fall by much more, to a level that is eventually 150 basis points below 
the level that would occur in a closed economy. This is due to the fact that 
the developing countries’ population is growing fast and they are catching 
up in terms of GDP growth (and so will save more), while at the same time 
the Northern countries face higher PAYG taxes (and therefore save less). As 
a matter of fact, capital will flow from North to South until 2020, but after 
                                                        
48 This drop is larger than calculated by e.g. Börsch-Supan et al. (2006), which can be 
explained by (among other things) the fact that this paper applies fewer overlapping 
generations, a lower value of the capital share in output, a higher discount factor and the 
absence of leisure in the individual utility function. 
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that the direction changes, and capital will flow from South to North. This 
result is also found by Brooks (2003) with a simulation model, and by 
Helliwell (2004) based on empirical results. The drop in the interest rate 
will be even more dramatic (from 7.4% to 2.8%, and thus about 450 basis 
points) if Northern countries reform their pension systems towards a fully 
funded scheme without creating additional government debt. 
 
8.4 Capital flows to China and India  
Instead of treating all developing countries as one group, as in Attanasio et 
al. (2007), the paper by Fehr et al. (2008) specifically considers China 
andIndia as separate countries to which capital can flow. The other regions 
are the US, the EMU countries, and Northeast Asia. Furthermore, a 
distinction is made between low-, middle- and high-skilled labour. The 
labour productivity of China is assumed to converge to the US level in 15 
years, and that of India in 75 years. Furthermore, the rate of time 
preference in these two countries is initially relatively low (implying high 
savings rates), but is assumed to converge to the level of other countries by 
the year 2030. Two scenarios are considered: with and without China and 
India. Without these countries, the interest rate will slightly decrease until 
2020, but then increase to a level that is 80 basis points higher in 2100 
than it is today (starting from a rate of 11.9%). This is due to two reasons. 
First, the assumption that technological progress causes the time 
endowment to grow at an exogenously given constant rate of 1% per year, 
which increases effective labour supply and decreases the capital-labour 
ratio. Second, this model comprises a detailed tax and social security 
system for the countries (including e.g., health-care, the costs of which are 
to a large extent borne by working individuals). Hence, ageing implies 
higher tax rates (as is the case with DB-pensions), which have a negative 
effect on savings (also because capital taxes rise). Altogether, this implies 
that ageing reduces savings more than the (effective) labour supply does, 
so the capital-labour ratio decreases, the interest rate rises and wages 
decrease. 
 However, the inclusion of China and India leads to a sharp decrease of 
the interest rate (of 360 basis points by 2050), and a small increase 
thereafter. This is due to the rapid increase in the supply of capital by 
these countries, and their ageing populations. In the medium- and long 
run, these capital flows to the US and EMU will lead to a higher GDP. This is 
accompanied by a sharp increase of the wage received by high-skilled 
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labour (23%), while low-skilled labour earns a wage that is 25% lower, 
which means that income inequality will increase substantially. 
 
8.5 Summary 
The simulation studies that have appeared in the literature all predict a 
decrease of the interest rate, roughly by about 1 percentage point. While 
this can hardly be classified as an asset meltdown, it will nevertheless have 
substantial consequences for different generations. The decrease will be 
more pronounced if many countries move towards a more-funded scheme 
(e.g. by keeping the PAYG contribution rate constant and lowering pension 
benefits), and if the retirement age is not increased. Capital flows to 
countries like China and India can in the short run attenuate the drop in 
the interest rate, but in the medium- and long run they will reinforce the 
drop. This crucially depends on the development in these countries: the 
faster they converge to the developed countries (in terms of technological 
progress, savings rates, demographics etc.), the lower the interest rate will 
be, and a situation of dynamic inefficiency is more likely to occur. 
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9. Policy implications  
 
Although ageing is a worldwide phenomenon, the timing and the extent of 
ageing differ between countries. Moreover, there are large differences in 
institutions, policies and preferences. These differences may lead to 
international capital flows. For example, countries where the population is 
ageing relatively fast or where workers retire early will see part of their 
savings flow abroad. Also countries with a relatively small unfunded 
pension scheme or with a low rate of time preference will experience an 
outflow of capital. These capital flows have several consequences: they 
may lead to spillover effects (implying that uncoordinated policy making 
may be suboptimal), but they may also offer possibilities to smooth the 
consequences of local demographic changes over the globe (implying that 
the consequences for factor prices will be relatively small). 
 Since capital can move freely within the European Monetary Union, 
perfect capital mobility seems a reasonable assumption. The differences in 
ageing patterns among the countries in this region are not very large, 
however, which implies that there will only be minor possibilities to 
smooth the consequences of population ageing via capital flows within the 
EMU. On the other hand, institutions vary considerably within the EMU, and 
international spillover effects from this source may be important. If, for 
example, some countries increase the retirement age and others do not, 
capital will flow from the latter countries to the former. Moreover, 
countries with relatively large funded schemes, such as the Netherlands, 
will in the long run bear part of the burden of population ageing in 
countries with extensive PAYG schemes, particularly if these countries use 
government debt to finance part of the long-term costs of ageing. 
Mounting government debt in countries with large PAYG schemes implies a 
stronger incentive for these countries to lobby for surprise inflation, which 
would imply that part of the burden of debt is rolled over to countries with 
extensive funded schemes. On the other hand, these conflicting interests 
may increase the perceived inflation risk, which will increase the risk 
premium on nominal government bonds. This affects all countries in the 
monetary union negatively. In order to prevent this, it is important that all 
countries in the EMU comply with the Stability and Growth Pact and that 
the European Central Bank is independent, credible and transparent. 
Another implication of a higher risk of inflation is that it might be 
advisable that pension funds reallocate their investment portfolio more 
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towards real assets and invest less in nominal bonds if they guarantee the 
pension benefits of their market participants in real terms. Furthermore, 
governments might be forced by the market to issue indexed bonds so that 
the return on government bonds is guaranteed in real terms instead of in 
nominal terms. 
 From a global perspective, differences in demographics are much larger, 
but capital may not be as mobile as it is within the EMU. One of the key 
questions for policy is therefore whether the international capital flows are 
indeed large enough to prevent sizeable effects on wages and the interest 
rate. Or, will we experience a worldwide increase in savings, leading to a 
fall in the return to capital and possibly even an asset meltdown? In terms 
of theory, the question is whether the small-open-economy model or the 
closed-economy model is most appropriate for the analysis of the 
consequences of ageing. If the small-open-economy model applies (i.e., if 
demographic risks can be perfectly shared via the capital market), then the 
effects of ageing are relatively small: the economy is transformed into a 
rentier economy and the negative effects of an increase in longevity on 
consumption will be partly offset by the positive effects caused by a 
decrease in fertility (which frees up resources from investment). When the 
closed-economy model applies, the increase in savings cannot be 
channeled abroad, but has to be invested in the home economy, leading to 
a decrease in the return to capital and rising wages. This raises lifetime 
utility, but the consequences for workers and retirees will be contradictory: 
whereas workers can consume more, retirees can consume less. Such a 
development may be regarded as undesirable from the viewpoint of 
solidarity between workers and retirees. However, ageing makes it 
increasingly difficult to prevent growing inequality between these two 
groups. PAYG pensions may moderate the differences in the consequences 
for both, but this comes at the cost of worsening economic development in 
general: with a sizeable PAYG scheme, average consumption possibilities 
will fall with ageing. The same holds for intergenerational transfers in 
funded defined-benefit schemes, particularly if they promise a wage-
indexed benefit. Consequently, the more the closed-economy scenario 
applies, the more pronounced the effects of ageing will be, and the greater 
the dilemma between efficiency and intergenerational equity. 
 Whether the open-economy model or the closed-economy model is most 
appropriate is largely an empirical question. Countries can invest their 
excess savings abroad, in countries with younger populations, only if 
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capital is sufficiently mobile internationally. Empirical research shows that, 
although mobility is not perfect, capital has become more mobile over the 
last decades. The most likely scenario will therefore be between that of a 
small open economy and a closed economy. Recent simulation studies 
using multi-country models show that the interest rate is expected to drop 
by about 1 percentage point in the long run due to ageing. While this 
cannot be classified as an asset meltdown, it will nevertheless have 
substantial consequences for different generations, particularly the elderly. 
The actual decrease may be higher if many countries reform their pension 
scheme to a more-funded system, and if the retirement age is not 
increased. The greatest risk with respect to the return on capital in the long 
run is due to capital flows from countries like China and India. Although 
capital flows to these countries may attenuate the decrease in the interest 
rate in the short run, they will reinforce the drop in the long run. Precisely 
how strong this effect will be depends crucially on the development in 
these countries: the faster they converge to developed countries, the lower 
the interest rate will be. The effect may be substantial: studies predict 
decreases of the interest rate up to 4.5 percentage points, especially when 
many countries switch to funded pensions. While this still cannot be seen 
as a complete asset meltdown, changes of this magnitude would of course 
have huge effects on retirees and pension funds and may even push the 
economy towards a situation of dynamic inefficiency. 
 These results provoke the question to what extent a country should rely 
on investing on the capital market to secure a decent old-age income, and 
which part of the pension savings should be invested internationally. Some 
claim that it would be welfare-improving if pension funds invested a larger 
part of their capital in their own country (arguing that this would not only 
increase national investments, and thus boost the economy, but would 
also make the pension funds less sensitive to developments on the 
international capital market). Indeed, as discussed in Section 2.4, an 
outflow of capital may decrease domestic welfare. However, with open 
capital markets, changing the investment policy of pension funds will have 
virtually no effects. If a larger part of pension savings is invested 
domestically, the resulting downward pressure on the interest rate will 
stimulate other domestic investors as well as foreign investors to reallocate 
their portfolios and invest a larger part in other countries. Eventually, the 
interest rate will still be equal to the rate determined on the international 
capital market. Pension funds will therefore be unable to escape the 
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consequences of international developments for the capital market unless 
the entire country is effectively isolated from the international capital 
market. This is not a serious policy option, however. 
 In conclusion, the capacity of the capital market to guarantee a 
prosperous old-age, especially in times of population ageing, appears to 
be much smaller than it may seem from a microeconomic perspective. 
Taking this into account, it would be wise to not put all of our eggs into 
one basket and to leave a role for intergenerational transfers. PAYG 
schemes or defined-benefit elements in funded schemes provide a 
valuable complement to the possibilities for providing old-age income 
offered by the capital market (i.e., via private savings or defined-
contribution schemes). However, we cannot escape the trade-off between 
efficiency and intergenerational equity; ageing raises the dependency ratio 
and thus the ‘price’ of intergenerational solidarity. Therefore, the policy to 
maintain a decent standard of living in old age is not complete without a 
third element: the labour market. The flip side of the abundance of capital 
due to the growing savings for old age is that labour will become relatively 
scarce and wages will rise. Relying to a larger extent on the labour market 
to provide income during old age therefore becomes increasingly attractive 
(i.e., intensifying labour-force participation by the elderly). With rising 
longevity and a rising reward for labour, this seems to be a natural choice. 
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SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION 
 
 
  
     
Population Ageing and the International Capital Market 
By Yvonne Adema, Bas van Groezen and Lex Meijdam 
Discussants: Leon Bettendorf and Hans Fehr 
    
  
Adema, van Groezen and Meijdam analyse the effects of ageing (policies) on 
the interest rate and on wages in the long run and in an international 
context. The effects are analysed by investigating how ageing affects the 
capital-labour ratio (k≡(K/L)). The authors conclude that ageing will, in the 
long run, increase the capital capital-labour ratio, leading to a decrease in 
the world interest rate and an increase in wages. 
     
 
Discussion by Leon Bettendorf  
  
Adema et al.'s paper deserves praise for its extensiveness in combining both 
theory and empirics, and in clearly distinguishing the effects of ageing on 
closed, small open and intermediate economies. The main limitations of the 
paper relate to its focus on the long run alone and its deterministic setting, 
setting aside all effects of uncertainty and diversification in assets and 
goods. 
 
Spillover effects put into perspective 
The authors focus on the (international spillover) effects of ageing running 
through the international capital market (capital flows and the interest rate 
r). In order to put their findings into perspective, Bettendorf thought that it 
would be worthwhile to consider the spillover effects of ageing through 
other channels too.  
 First, consideration should be taken of the spillover effects of ageing 
through the channel of monetary policy in the European Monetary Union. 
The authors of the paper argued that PAYG countries with high government 
debt could pressure the European Central Bank (ECB) to increase inflation in 
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order to decrease the value of their debt. However, Bettendorf found this to 
be unlikely, given that the ECB has shown a high degree of independence 
until now. He therefore posited that an opposite effect might be even more 
likely: spillover effects from fast- to slow ageing countries can be expected, 
as the former are more likely to face higher inflation, compelling the ECB to 
increase interest rates. 
 A second channel through which spillover effects from ageing might be 
expected, is labour mobility. With population ageing, countries with more 
rewarding pension schemes (think of the Netherlands, for example) could 
become more attractive to immigrants (say, from Eastern European 
countries) than the countries with less rewarding pension schemes (which 
are currently attracting immigrants). 
 Thirdly, as ageing intensifies and the labour costs rise, we can expect 
innovative labour-saving technological progress spillovers to become more 
prevalent. 
 Bettendorf suggested that relaxing the paper's assumption that domestic 
and foreign tradable goods are perfect substitutes would reveal a fourth 
channel: as ageing changes the relative demands and prices of tradables, 
spillover effects arise through flows of tradables and real exchange rates.  
Finally, account should be taken of the effect of ageing on non-tradables 
(e.g. health-care services). The demand for these is likely to be higher in an 
ageing economy. Hence, one could argue that economies will tend to 
become more closed, reducing the amount of spillover effects from one 
country to another. 
 
Focus on the spillover effects of ageing through the international capital 
market 
Bettendorf then commented on the spillover effects of ageing through the 
international capital market, as analysed in the paper.   
  
• A note on welfare spillover effects of pension funding 
Bettendorf found that of the most interesting conclusions of the paper is 
that countries with large funded pensions will, in the long run, bear part of 
the ageing burden of PAYG-countries. To fully appreciate this conclusion, he 
noted that a few subtleties should be kept in mind.  
 Consider, for example, a world that consists of a country with large 
funded pensions (say, the Netherlands) and a PAYG country that increases its 
government debt (say, Italy). Italy's increasing debt leads to a crowding out 
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of capital (i.e., a decline in the capital-labour ratio). A first important note 
with respect to the welfare implications of the increased debt is that the 
initial, short-run effect will lead to a welfare increase in both countries. All 
effects described in the paper hence only apply in the long run, and are 
opposite to those of the short run. A relevant question is then whether 
short-run or long-run effects should be given greater emphasis. Secondly, 
in the long run, a welfare loss for the Netherlands can be expected that 
dampens the welfare loss of Italy, as argued in the paper. However, it 
should be mentioned that Italy is also experiencing a welfare loss in the 
long run that is even larger than the welfare loss of the Netherlands. 
 Bettendorf then made some reflections on this result. A fundamental 
cause of the current credit crisis can be found in the global imbalances in 
savings. The huge savings of both China and the OPEC countries led to a low 
world interest rate that contributed to bubbles in, for instance, the asset 
markets and housing markets. In the future, the supply of savings money 
from these (ageing) countries is likely to remain high or even increase. To 
counterbalance the downward pressure on the interest rate, therefore, a 
growing demand for capital (coming from some countries issuing debt at 
the other side of the market) doesn't seem too unappealing. 
 
• The "one asset" assumption 
Whereas Bettendorf agreed with the authors’ assertion that, within the 
EMU, perfect capital mobility is a reasonable assumption, he maintained 
that this does not imply that domestic and foreign assets are perfect 
substitutes, yielding the same interest rate. As an illustration he mentioned  
the interest-rate  spread on ten-year (10y) government bonds. Consider the 
interest rate on 10y government bonds of Italy, Greece and the Netherlands, 
respectively, relative to the interest rate on 10y government bonds of 
Germany. Between 2008 and this date, these countries were consistently 
paying a higher interest rate than Germany, with peaks up to 3 percent (for 
Greece) and more than 2 percent (for Italy) in February. The Netherlands was 
paying about half a percent more than Germany in February.  
 Bettendorf returned now to the previous example concerning Italy issuing 
debt: this would cause Italy's interest rate to increase more (higher risk 
premium). A beneficial situation for the Netherlands then arises, as Dutch 
pension funds would be able to invest in foreign government bonds 
yielding a high interest rate, while the government itself would issue bonds 
at a lower interest rate. 
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• Simulation results from CGE-models for the interest rate 
The final point made by Bettendorf concerned the paper’s summary of the 
simulation results as follows: "The simulation studies all predict a decrease 
of the interest rate by about 1% point".  
 Bettendorf found this to be a bit misleading, in view of different starting 
levels. While some studies (INGENUE, 2002) start at 4.2% and predict a 
decrease of almost one percentage point at the top of ageing, other studies 
(Börsch-Supan et al., 2006) predict a similar fall in the interest rate, but 
starting at about 7 percent. Hence the resulting interest rate prediction is 
thus far from unanimous. 
 
 
Discussion by Hans Fehr 
 
Hans Fehr's comments on the paper were structured as follows. First and 
foremost, he expounded on the relationship between population ageing 
and the world interest rate. Second, he highlighted the missing aspects of 
uncertainty. Finally, he emphasized the importance of analysing the effects 
of ageing in a global context. 
 
Population ageing and the world's interest rate 
Fehr noted that Adema et al.'s results in terms of the interest rate and 
wages are based upon the effects of ageing on the capital-labour ratio, 
which are found to be positive (ageing leads to capital deepening; i.e., an 
increase of k=K/L). The paper then nicely describes how capital deepening 
leads to a decrease of the world interest rate and an increase of wages.  
 This result is clear in an economy without government, and in the long 
run. The paper also explains how having a PAYG scheme obscures the effects 
of ageing on the interest rate. Fehr noted, however, that in most simulation 
studies the existence of counterbalancing effects in the PAYG scheme case 
are never dominating over the primary effects of capital deepening. 
Hence, the paper predicts a decrease in the interest rate between 0.8% and 
2.6% and a rise of real wages by up to 13%. Such an increase of real wages 
would be a very positive aspect in helping finance the cost of ageing.  
However, Hans Fehr expressed his doubts whether such an optimistic view 
(high wage rise expectations) is realistic since these results are highly 
dependent on the specific public sector context in which they were derived. 
Indeed, while a government sector is assumed in Adema et al., it is merely 
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present in the form of an institution providing a PAYG pension scheme. A 
health care system, a long-term care system and a tax system are all 
missing in the model.  
 Kotlikoff, Smetters and Walliser (2007) introduce a very detailed model of 
the American economy with ageing. In addition to the PAYG pension 
scheme, their model included a health care system, long-term care system 
and a tax system. A crucial difference in this model is that the tax base is 
allowed to change as the population structure alters. The proportion of the 
working population to pensioners decreases, so that taxes need to increase 
to keep financing public goods.  
 Fehr, Jokisch and Kotlikoff (2004, 2008) extended the original model of 
Kotlikoff, Smetters and Walliser (2007) to include Europe and Japan in 
addition to the United States. In their model, which also includes a detailed 
tax- and social security system, ageing is found to reduce savings more than 
the effective labour supply. Thus, the capital-labour ratio is predicted to 
decrease. The world interest rate therefore increases, while wages decrease 
(by 3 percentage points and 15 percentage points, respectively). Whether or 
not this scenario is valid, this result still provides insights contrary to those 
discussed in Adema et al.  
 
Population ageing and the international risk premium 
Since the authors excluded most of the discussion about uncertainty, an 
important point is missing. In any discussion of the effects of ageing on the 
capital market, both the interest rate and the risk premium should be 
considered. 
 As optimal portfolio shares for risky assets fall with rising age, population 
ageing will change the demand structures for shares and bonds, so that the 
risk premium increases. Note that this is merely a consequence of optimal 
portfolio behaviour, and not of an increase in risk aversion.   
 
Population ageing and globalisation 
Finally, Fehr noted that the effect of globalisation cannot be over-
emphasized. Fehr, Jokisch and Kotlikoff (2008) estimate a model with and 
without India and China. The results in their paper changed dramatically. In 
the case with only 3 three countries (US, Europe and Japan), the interest rate 
is found to slightly increase, while wages are decreasing. However, with the 
inclusion of India and China, with their very high savings and growth rates, 
the interest rate drops considerably, while wages do not rise. As in Adema 
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et al., capital moves from the south to the north, with the effects of 
globalisation on the capital market dominating demographic effects. Hence, 
Fehr argued that we should consider ageing in a more global context, taking 
into account developments in countries such as China and India. 
 
 
The authors' reply   
 
Bas van Groezen agreed with Leon Bettendorf that a country's increasing 
government debt leads to a long-term welfare loss not only for other 
(funded) countries, but also for the country itself. However, this does not 
alter the paper's point that the dampening of the welfare loss for the 
issuing country by other countries leads to an increased incentive for issuing 
debt by the former country. 
 
Yvonne Adema responded to both Leon Bettendorf and several people in the 
public who had questions regarding the importance of the short-run effects 
of ageing. She agreed that the welfare effects of ageing in the short run 
could very well be opposite to those in the long run. The aim of the paper, 
however, was not to focus on the short run or on the current credit crisis, as 
the truly major effects of ageing will be experienced in the long run (say, 20 
years) only. 
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The prospective ageing of the population in many countries will 
affect the economy in many different ways. Yvonne Adema (Erasmus 
University Rotterdam and Netspar), Bas van Groezen (Utrecht 
University and Netspar) and Lex Meijdam (Tilburg University and 
Netspar) focus in this paper on the long-run effects on the 
international capital market by providing an overview of insights 
from both theoretical and empirical literature related to this topic. 
The final part of this paper is devoted to the quantitative effects 
found by various recent simulation studies.
